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NOTES AND COMMENTS
SMOKELESS TOBACCO: DEFECTIVE
MARKETING CREATES A NEW TOXIC TORT
Warning: Use of snuff can be addictive and can cause mouth cancer
and other mouth disorders'
I. INTRODUCTION
Smokeless tobacco2 (smokeless) appears destined to join the ranks of
the Ford Pinto, MER/29, DES, the Dalkon shield, and asbestos in legal
history. In cases involving each of those products a proverbial smoking
gun was disgorged from the defendants' files. Smokeless will undoubt-
edly produce similar stonewalling and then damning revelations. An-
other similarity with those products exists in that the smokeless problem
is surprisingly widespread. As one state official has described it, "[t]here
is a chemical time bomb ticking in the mouths of hundreds of thousands
of boys in this country."3
1. Mandatory warning label on smokeless tobacco products sold in Massachusetts, the first
state to require such a label. Mass. Dep't of Pub. Health, 105 C.M.R. § 650.105 (Supp. 1985). This
regulation, as well as comparable legislation proposed in nearly 30 states, will undoubtedly be pre-
empted by federal legislation. Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986, S.
1574, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. Rac. H245-47 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1986).
The new federal law would prohibit all radio and television advertisement. Id. at H246. It
would require the rotating use of three warning labels:
(1) WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE MOUTH CANCER;
(2) WARNING: THIS PRODUCT MAY CAUSE GUM DISEASE AND TOOTH DECAY;
(3) WARNING: THIS PRODUCT IS NOT A SAFE ALTERNATIVE TO CIGARETTES.
Id. at H245-46. The bill also calls for ingredient reporting to the Secretary of Health and Human
Services and permits the Secretary to make state grants and provide other assistance for the estab-
lishment of state laws setting 18 as the minimum age for the purchase of smokeless. Id.
2. Referring to all smokeless tobacco products as simply "smokeless" is currently in vogue, at
least with the media and the tobacco industry. This idiom is adopted herein for the sake of brevity.
Smokeless products encompass basically chewing tobacco and snuff. Chewing tobacco is loose
tobacco; a large quantity (a plug) is held in the cheek and the tobacco is chewed or sucked, and the
juice is spit out. Snuff is finely shredded or powdered tobacco which is held in smaller quantities in
the canal at the base of the lower gum next to the cheek. A new product offers snuff in a tea-bag like
pouch which eliminates the need to "dip" one's fingers into the tobacco container, and also reduces
the need to spit.
3. Wallis, Into the Mouths of Babes, TIME, July 15, 1985, at 68 (quoting Dr. Gregory Con-
nolly, Director of the Dental Division of the Massachusetts Department of Public Health).
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Product liability for death and injury incurred through the use of
smokeless is but one type of suit among the numerous massive toxic tort
claims which are predicted to dominate tort law during the next decade.
4
Arguably, the individual or "private" civil suit may not represent the
best solution to social problems such as tobacco usage. Nevertheless, the
smokeless suits appear inevitable, and plaintiffs' attorneys may find fertile
ground for individual recoveries based on the invariant concepts support-
ing the well established "failure to warn" tort theory.5
The scientific evidence linking the use of smokeless to oral cancer
and other diseases is already so overwhelming as to leave little doubt that
the use of smokeless exposes the user to a serious health risk.6 The 1982
Surgeon General's Report unequivocably stated that certain tobacco
products, such as snuff, have the highest level of carcinogens (i.e., nitro-
samines) in any consumer product taken into the body.' Snuff contains
carcinogens eight to ten times as concentrated as in cigarette tobacco.8
4. See Podgers, Toxic Time Bombs Say Latent Disease Suits Will Be Key Battleground in '80s,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1981, at 139.
5. See infra note 96 and accompanying text (noting political default). It is interesting to note
that the courts will be forced to deal with the smokeless problem at a time when the law is evolving
in the area of strict products liability in general, and latent disease suits in particular. The smokeless
suits may result in the litigation of a number of fairly unique legal concepts-such as generic risk,
assumed risk, and defective marketing. See infra text accompanying notes 97-105 (listing legal is-
sues).
A recent publication concludes "that product liability law supports the imposition of liability on
tobacco suppliers." Commentary, The Smokeless Tobacco Industry's Failure to Warn: A Case for
the Courts, 6 J. LEGAL MED. 489, 490 (1986). Apparently, the author also concludes that once a
warning is provided, the courts will cease to be an appropriate forum for smokeless victims. Id. at
507. This Comment, on the other hand, advocates liability despite a warning. See itfra text accom-
panying notes 204-12, 254-60. See generally Brody, Recovery Against Tobacco Companies, TRIAL,
Nov. 1985, at 49.
6. See infra App.
7. REPORT OF THE SURGEON GEN., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING, CANCER
203-04 (1982).
8. Nitrosamines have been linked to cancer in thousands of epidemiological, experimental,
pathological, and clinical studies. E.g., id. at 21, 202, 207, 220.
Chemical analysis of various types of smokeless tobacco has revealed the presence of
polonium-210, a radioactive alpha-emitter and known radiation carcinogen, and represen-
tative of two classes of powerful chemical carcinogens, the polycyclic aromatic hydrocar-
bons and the nitrosamines.
Of the 19 nitrosamines identified in smokeless tobacco, the carcinogenic nitrosamines
present the highest concentration are NNN and NNK, both of which are related chemi-
cally to nicotine. Snuff contains 1.6 to 135 mg per kilogram (mg/kg) of NNN and 0.1 to 14
mg/kg of NNK. For comparison, U.S. foods and beverages may not contain more than
0.01 mg/kg of nitrosamines. U.S. looseleaf and plug tobacco contain 0.2 to 8.2 mg/kg of
NNN and 0 to 1.0 mg/kg of NNK.
Both NNN and NNK readily produce cancer in rats and hamsters in organs such as
the nose, trachea, esophagus, and liver. Benign tumors (papillomas) of the mouth are in-
duced when NNN and NNK are applied directly to the mouth of rats.
NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, CONSENSUS DEVELOPMENT CONFERENCE STATEMENT: HEALTH IM-
PLICATIONS OF SMOKELESS TOBACCO USE, JAN. 13-15, 1986, reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. H253,
2
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Indeed, the cancer risk associated with smokeless is greater than that
associated with cigarettes.9
Recent media attention has certainly raised general consumer con-
sciousness about the risks of smokeless,"° particularly with respect to us-
age by young people. However, the tobacco industry continues to foster
myths which mislead consumers into believing that smokeless poses no
particular health risks and offers a safe alternative to cigarettes."
This Comment will illustrate that smokeless is a serious public
health problem. Such a discussion exemplifies the factual basis for a
"smokeless" toxic tort action. This Comment will then provide an over-
view of the applicable theories of recovery for defective marketing.
Then, to a limited extent, the significance of the smokeless suit is consid-
ered in the context of its role in the evolution of strict tort liability as a
social policy.
Accepting for the sake of argument that smokeless is a serious prob-
lem, how effective a solution is our current tort system likely to generate?
Private civil suits and media attention will have some direct impact.
Furthermore, they trigger overdue government regulation such as re-
quired warning labels 2 and restrictions on sales to minors.' 3 Ironically,
H254 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1986) [hereinafter cited as NIH STATEMENT]. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., PUB. HEALTH SERV., THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON CARCINOGENS
SUMMARY (1983) (providing summaries of known risk with numerous nitrosamine variations).
9. While the incidence of lung cancer from smoking is greater than oral cancer from smoke-
less, the relative risk assumed of acquiring cancer is much higher with smokeless. E.g., Winn, Blot,
Shy, Dr. P.H., Pickle, Toledo & Fraumeni, Snuff Dipping and Oral Cancer Among Women in the
Southern United States, 304 NEW ENG. J. MED. 745, 747 (1981). Furthermore, the mortality rate
with oral cancer is much higher, partly because it often goes undetected. See infra note 203.
10. Connant & Hager, No-Risk Nicotine?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 27, 1986, at 57; see also supra note
3, infra notes 68, 88 (cites to other well known publications).
11. The tobacco industry has repeatedly publicly denied any causal link between their product
and cancer. In fact, this is the primary message proffered by an industry public relations organiza-
tion, the Smokeless Tobacco Council. See, eg., Wallis, supra note 3, at 68.
You will recall that I appeared before your Subcommittee on July 26, 1985, to express
the position of the smokeless tobacco manufacturers regarding proposed federal legislation
concerning the labeling of smokeless tobacco products. I advised you that it was the posi-
tion of the smokeless tobacco manufacturers that health warnings relating to their products
were unwarranted in view of the unresolved scientific controversy regarding smokeless to-
bacco and health. The position of the smokeless tobacco manufacturers on this issues has
not changed.
Letter from Michael J. Kerrigan, President of Smokeless Tobacco Council to Hon. Henry A. Wax-
man, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment (Jan. 27, 1986), reprinted in
132 CONG. REC. H245, H247 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 1986). A spokesman for the world's largest smoke-
less manufacturer appeared on a prime time national news program to repeatedly insist that it has
not been scientifically proven that smokeless causes cancer. He stated that no product is perfectly
safe; there is a risk in every single product. Interview on CBS news program 60 Minutes, aired Feb.
2, 1985; see also infra text accompanying notes 73-78 (noting example of advertising).
12. At the time of this writing, federal hearings have already been held on requiring a nation-
3
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such attacks may actually provide the industry with the legal insulation
of assumed risk or informed consent defenses.14 Never having to ac-
knowledge the ugly truth, the industry remains free to continue perpetu-
ating the same myths. 5 Criticizing the adequacy of that scenario, the
final portion of this Comment opines that the unique characteristics of
smokeless warrant the application of a legal theory which effectuates ab-
solute liability.16
II. PROFILE OF THE PRODUCT
Negative aspects of smokeless include: marketing without regard
for health dangers, use by young people, and the habit-forming nature of
the product. Thus, smokeless considered as a whole reveals industry
conduct and a resultant product 17 with serious shortcomings. These as-
pects are explained as follows.
A. A Deadly Danger
A study of the type of oral cancer associated with smokeless during
the period of 1973-1977 revealed an incidence rate of 7.7 per 100,000
population per year and a mortality rate of 3.1.'8 These figures may
grossly underestimate the current rates of occurrences in light of the in-
wide warning, and banning television and radio advertising. Passage of the bill is imminent. See
supra note 1.
13. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§ 1241-1242 (Supp. 1985) (proscribing sale to, or possession by,
minors).
14. This is a result lamented by commentators on the legal history of cigarettes. E.g., Garner,
Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 1423, 1429. But cf.
132 CONG. REC. H245, H253 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1986).
As a final point, I would like to briefly address the issue of product liability. I believe
the amendment could not be more clear as to our intent. This measure is not intended to
have any impact on product liability suits. It is not to be construed as relieving any person
of his liability at common law.
Id. (statement of bill sponsor, Oklahoma Congressman Mike Synar).
15. Admittedly, it is absurd to require a profit oriented entity to tell its customers not to buy its
product. More absurd, however, is a system which deals with problems by awaiting gross harm, and
then reacts by imposing liability resulting in bankruptcy. This Comment searches for a middle
ground.
16. See infra notes 254-60 and text accompanying notes 222-53. Like other mass toxic torts,
smokeless presents legal problems which have prompted leading scholars to seriously question the
adequacy of our current tort jurisprudence.
17. The concept of a 'product' should be taken to include all of the ambient circumstances
which accompany that product in addition to the tangible item itself. The concept of defective
marketing is encompassed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1977) (direc-
tions and warnings, or lack thereof, as part of the product).
18. NATIONAL CANCER INST., SURVEILLANCE, EPIDEMIOLOGY AND END RESULTS: INCI-
DENTS AND MORTALITY DATA 1973-1977, at Tables 5, 10(D), (J) (N.C.I. Monograph 57, N.I.H.
Publication 81-2330 n.d.).
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creased use of snuff.19 Estimates of the number of smokeless users today
varies from 7 to 22 million.2 0
There were an estimated 7,240 deaths from oral cancer of the type
associated with smokeless in 1980.21 Given that 3.8% of the population
had then used snuff long enough to develop cancer,22 conservative as-
sumptions indicate that at least 10.2% or 738 of those deaths would have
occurred due to that use.23 A more accurate estimate of today's incidence
of death due to smokeless may be 21.8% of a population stratum where
9.3% use smokeless.24 Hence, the national smokeless death count is
now, at a minimum, at about two thousand victims each year and rising.
Aside from the fact that smokeless contains known carcinogenic
agents, the primary link between smokeless and cancer follows from the
higher incidence of oral cancer among users than among the general pop-
ulation. Where sex, age, or regional differences were considered as con-
trol factors, studies have established a positive correlation which presents
a convincing indictment against smokeless. For example, oral cancer
rates among women in the southeast, where the use of smokeless is fairly
common, run 30% higher in urban areas and 90% higher in rural areas
than the comparable rates among women in the north, where the use of
smokeless is rare. 5
The most often cited authority on the link is a 1981 study conducted
in North Carolina.26 It involved 255 women with oral and pharyngeal
cancer and utilized 502 control factors.27 The study revealed that the
19. See infra note 33.
20. E.g., Darmstadter, Snuff and Chow: The Tobacco Industry Plugs Nicotine by Osmosis, Bus.
& Soc'y REV., Fall 1980, at 23, 24; see also PUBLIC HEALTH SERV., NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH,
NAT'L CANCER INST., IN ANSWER To YOUR QUESTIONS ABOUT SMOKELESS TOBACCO (April 11,
1983) (written statement from the Office of Cancer Communications).
21. PETITION OF PUBLIC CITIZEN HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP TO REQUIRE DISCLOSURE OF
HEALTH RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF SMOKELESS TOBACCO, TRR-20947 at 3 & n.12
(F.T.C. filed Feb. 14, 1984) (citing National Center for Health Statistics) [hereinafter cited as FTC
PETITION].
22. Id. at 5 & n.17 (citing NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR SMOKING AND HEALTH, ADULT
USE OF TOBACCO, 1975 (U.S.D.H.E.W., P.H.S. June 1976)).
23. Id.
24. FTC PETITION, supra note 21, at 4 & n.16, 5; see also Fincher, Sean Marsee's Smokeless
Death, READERS DIG., Oct. 1985, at 110, 112 (quoting Dr. Connolly's claim that tobacco accounts
for 70% of the 9,000 oral cancer deaths each year); Winn, supra note 9, at 747 (noting 60% cancer
increase due to snuff).
25. Blot & Fraumeni, Geographic Patterns of Oral Cancer in the United States: Etiological Im-
plications, 30 J. CHRON. DIs. 745 (1977); see also T. MASON, F. MCKAY, R. HOOVER, W. BLOT & J.
FRAUMENI, ATLAS OF CANCER MORTALITY FOR U.S. COUNTIES: 1950-1969 (Gov't Printing Office
1975).
26. Winn, supra note 9.
27. Id. at 746.
1986]
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exceptionally high mortality rate from these cancers among white wo-
men in the south was primarily related to the chronic use of snuff.28 The
estimated rate of cancer among southern women using snuff was found to
be twenty-six cases per 100,000 population-significantly higher than the
general population rate.29 The study concluded that (1) snuff increased
the risk of developing oral cancer by more than four times, 30 (2) chronic
use of snuff (fifty years or more) resulted in a fifty-fold increase in cancers
of the gingiva and buccal mucosa, 31 and (3) 87% of the oral cancers in
the group could be attributed to snuff use.32
Oral cancer is fairly rare in America, accounting for only about 4%
of all cancers:33 that means over 27,000 new occurrences each year, of
which 60% will be fatal within five years. 34 The incidence of oral cancer
in males (5.8% of all cancers) is more than twice as common as in wo-
men (1.97%). 31 These statistics tend to reflect the pattern of smokeless
use in America. A small percentage of the population uses the product,36
and use is much more common in males.37 In comparison, studies of
Asia where the use of smokeless is common, revealed a high incidence of
oral cancer. 8 For example, in some Indian villages over 40% of the
population are smokeless users.39 Oral cancer, India's most common
form of cancer, accounts for about 40% of all cancer related deaths.40
Numerous studies from Asia have scientifically documented the causal
relationship.41 A 1982 article reviewing studies involving over 300,000
people condemned tobacco as the ingredient which caused a significantly
higher risk of oral cancer vis-A-vis alternative chews (betel leaf or areca
28. Id. at 746-48.
29. Id. at 748.
30. Id. at 747.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. E.g., AMERICAN CANCER SOC'Y, CANCER FACTS & FIGURES 12-13 (1984).
34. Id. at 18.
35. Id. at 13.
36. FTC PETITION, supra note 21, at 5 & n.17 (in 1975, 3.8% used snuff, 5.5% chew).
37. Id. (snuff-2.5% male, 1.3% female; chew-4.9% male, 0.6% female).
38. See Hirayama, An Epidemiological Study of Oral and Pharyngeal Cancer in Central and
South-East Asia, 34 BULL. WLD. HLTH. ORG. 41 (1966).
39. E.g., Mehta, Pindberg, ODONT, Gupta & Daftary, Epidemiologic and Histologic Study of
Oral Cancer and Leukoplakin Among 50,915 Villagers in India, 21 CANCER 832, 836 (1969); see also
Mehta, Ayhi, Gupta, Pindborg, Bhonsle & Jalnawalla, An Intervention Study of Oral Cancer and
Precancer in Rural Indian Populations: A Preliminary Report, 60 BULL. WLD. HLTH. ORG. 441
(1980).
40. Paymaster, Cancer and Its Distribution in India, 17 CANCER 1026, 1027-29 (1964); see also
Hirayama, supra note 38, at 44 (found oral cancer accounted for over 75% of cancers in regions
where tobacco abuse was especially prevalent).
41. See infra App.
[Vol. 21:499
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nut).4 2 The authors noted similar conclusions in a 1933 paper. They
deocribed the worldwide consensus among investigators as virtually
unanimous.43
Further studies are in process to more precisely establish the link
and attempt to explain how and why the cancers occur.44 While the
research does not compare in volume and precision with that existing for
the causal link between cigarettes and lung cancer,45 there appears to be
no doubt among the experts that a strong positive correlation between
oral cancer and smokeless has been established. These experts include:
the American Cancer Society,4 6 the American Health Foundation,47 the
Public Health Service of the Department of Health and Human Services,
including the Surgeon General48 and the National Cancer Institute,49 the
American Dental Association,5" the American Medical Association, l
Federal Centers for Disease Control of the Department of Health, Edu-
cation and Welfare,5" and the International Agency for Research on
Cancer of the World Health Organizations.5 3 The one study often cited
42. Gupta, Pindborg & Mehta, Comparison of Carcinogenicity of Betel Quid With and Without
Tobacco: An Epidemiological Review, I ECOLOGY OF DISEASE 213 (1982).
43. Id. at 217.
44. The National Cancer Institute has committed $7.5 million to determine patterns of use and
possible intervention techniques. Letter from Public Citizen, H.R.G., to C. Everett Koop, M.D.,
U.S. Surgeon General (Nov. 13, 1984) and response (Nov. 30, 1984); Letter from F.T.C. to Surgeon
General (Jan. 21, 1985) (requesting comprehensive review).
45. The NIH has identified numerous areas where additional study is necessary, for example:
c. Cancers of sites other than the mouth carried out in geographic areas with high rates of
smokeless tobacco use.
d. Potential role of smokeless tobacco in cardiovascular disease and adverse outcomes of
pregnancy.
e. Potential of users of smokeless tobacco to produce nitrosamines in vivo.
f. Research on the relationship between amounts of smokeless tobacco used and plasma
levels of lead, cadmium, and other potential toxins.
NIH STATEMENT, supra note 8, at H255.
46. AMERICAN CANCER Soc'y, DON'T BITE OFF MORE THAN YOU SHOULD CHEW (Pam-
phlet No. 2643-LE 1981); AMERICAN CANCER Soc'y, FIFrY MOST OFrEN ASKED QUESTIONS
ABOUT SMOKING AND HEALTH ... AND THE ANSWERS 22 (Pamphlet No. 2023-LE 1982).
47. E.g., infra App. n.50 (sponsored study).
48. E.g., Letter from C. Everett Koop, M.D., Surgeon General, to Hon. James C. Miller III,
Chairman of the F.T.C. (Dec. 31, 1984); see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
49. E.g., Fraumen, The Face of Cancer in the United States, 19 HosP. PRAC. 81 (1983) (spon-
sored study); see also infra note 61 and accompanying text.
50. E.g., infra App. n.23.
51. E.g., infra App. nn.50, 52.
52. E.g., Warnings Urged on Snuff, Chewing Tobacco, Tulsa World, Feb. 7, 1985, at A5, col. 3.
(article quotes Assistant U.S. Surgeon General, Robert Mecklenburg, statement that he and the
Surgeon General believe smokeless presents a cancer threat and is associated with other pathological
oral conditions).
53. Letter from H. Vainio, M.D., (I.A.R.C.) of the World Health Organization to A. Green-
berg, Public Citizen, H.R.G. (Nov. 30, 1984) (presented by Public Citizen H.R.G. in statement
before the Mass. Dept. of Health on Proposal to Require Warning Label on Tobacco Snuff on Feb. 6,
7
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by the tobacco industry54 offers conclusions disclaimed by its author as
outdated and unreliable." That study has also been denounced as statis-
tically invalid on its face by an epidemiologist at the National Cancer
Institute.5 6
Other conclusions may reasonably be drawn from the available liter-
ature. It appears that snuff poses a significantly greater risk to users than
chewing tobacco. 7 It also appears that smokeless may have a causal
connection with cancers other than oral cancer. Smokeless has been as-
sociated with cancer of the bladder, 8 pancreas, 9 and other organs.60
Smokeless causes excessive wear (abrasion) of the incisal and occlusal
teeth surfaces, advanced periodontal destruction of hard and soft tissues
of the mouth, erythema of the soft tissues, and leukoplakia .6  Finally, it
appears safe to say that most of the health risks described in this section
1985). LA.R.C. assembled a distinguished panel of experts from around the world to consider
smokeless. The final draft of their evaluation (attachment to the letter) reads as follows:
There is sufficient evidence that oral use of snuffs of the types commonly used in North
America and western Europe is carcinogenic to humans. There is limited evidence that
chewing tobacco of the types commonly used in these areas is carcinogenic.
Epidemiological studies that did not distinguish between chewing tobacco and snuff
provide sufficient evidence for the carcinogenicity of oral use of smokeless tobacco prod-
ucts, as reported in these studies.
In aggregate, there is sufficient evidence that oral use of smokeless tobacco of the
above types is carcinogenic to humans.
There is sufficient evidence that oral use of tobacco mixed with lime (khaini) is carci-
nogenic to humans.
There is inadequate evidence that oral use of the other smokeless tobacco preparations
considered (nass, nasswar, mishri, gudakhu, and shammah) is carcinogenic to humans.
There is inadequate evidence that nasal use of snuff is carcinogenic to humans.
Id. (emphasis in original).
54. Smith, Mincer, Hopkins & Bell, Snuff-Dipper's Lesions, 92 ARCHIVES OF OTOLARYNGOL-
OGY 450 (1975) (study of 15,000 dental patients who used snuff, found 1751 showed tissue abnormal-
ity mandating biopsies which revealed no cancer, among the 1550 observed 41/2 years later, 2
carcinomas and 12 cases of dyskeratosis, a dangerous condition which may progress to malignancy,
were detected; the fate of the other 201 is unknown).
55. Interview on CBS news program 60 Minutes, aired Feb. 2, 1985 (Smith stands by his study,
but admitted to 60 Minutes: "I just don't think that I am any longer an authority on the subject of
snuff. I am speaking as one who has not, admittedly has not, kept up with the literature." Smith
advised, "If you're not using smokeless tobacco don't start. If you are using it stop. .. ").
56. Letter from W.J. Blot to A. Greenberg, Public Citizen, H.R.G. (May 11, 1984).
57. Hoffman & Adams, Carcinogenic Tobacco-Speciic N-Nitrosamines in Snuff and in the
Saliva of Snuff Dippers, 41 CANCER RESEARCH 4305 (1981); see also infra App. nn.43, 50-52.
58. E.g., infra App. n.51.
59. E.g., infra App. n.49.
60. E.g., infra App. n.53.
61. E.g., infra App. nn.10, 32, 41 (all noting the association between leukoplakia caused by
smokeless and oral cancer).
Leukoplakia is evidenced by white patches in the mouth. Those patches result from the irrita-
tion of tobacco being absorbed through the skin. Leukoplakia is considered a pre-cancerous cell
condition which will ultimately become malignant in three to six percent of all cases.
8
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are time/dose related.62 The risks increase as the quantity used and the
duration used increase. In short, there is no real disagreement within the
medical community; smokeless does cause cancer and death.
B. The Target: America's Youth
Justice Felix Frankfurter wrote "[t]he law of imitation operates, and
non-conformity is not an outstanding characteristic of children., 63  A
spokesman for U.S. Tobacco was more direct: "We're counting on peer
pressure to increase sales." ' 4 The marketing plan is working; smokeless
sales jumped 32% from 1970 to 1979 when 125 million pounds were
sold.65 In 1984, smokeless having a retail value approaching $1 billion
was sold. This trend indicates a sales increase of over 60% since 1978.66
The typical snuff user has dropped in average age from about forty-five to
about twenty-five.67 The industry is not, however, publishing figures
concerning a conspicuous segment of their customers-those under age
18. Reports from all over the country indicate use of smokeless among
high school students has become increasingly common in recent years.
School surveys have indicated that 10-30% of American high school stu-
dents are regular users. 68 Furthermore, the use of smokeless is not un-
62. E.g., infra App. n.3.
63. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948).
64. See Darmstadter, supra note 20, at 25 (quoting William Nelson of the U.S. Tobacco Co.);
see also infra text accompanying note 73.
65. FTC PETITION, supra note 21, at 7 & n.25 (citing Shelton, Smokeless Sales Continue to
Climb, 109 TOBACCO REP. 41, 42 (1982)).
66. See Wallis, supra note 3, at 68; FTC PETITION, supra note 21, at 7; Darmstadter, supra note
20, at 24.
67. Darmstadter, supra note 20, at 23.
68. 132 CONG. REc. H245, H247, H250 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1986) (noting about one in three
users under age 18, and Texas study finding 88% of users began before age 15); Letter from A.
Greenspan, Esq. and S.M. Wolfe, M.D., P.C.P.H.G., to C. Everett Koop, M.D., Surgeon General, at
5 & nn.3-4 (Nov. 13, 1984). The letter cites two such studies. These same studies are noted in
SUPPLEMENT TO PETITION OF PUBLIC CITIZEN HEALTH RESEARCH GROUP TO REQUIRE DISCLO-
SURE OF HEALTH RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE USE OF SMOKELESS TOBACCO, TRR-20947
(F.T.C. filed June 21, 1984) [hereinafter cited as FTC PETITION SUPP.]. The first study was done in
the Eugene, Oregon area and found 9% of 7th graders, 19% of 9th graders, and 23% of 10th graders
were daily users. Id. at 2.
The other study cited was conducted in Bogalusa, Louisiana which found a six-fold increase
since a prior survey five years earlier. The use of chewing tobacco was more prevalent than the use
of snuff. The snuff numbers alone are shocking:
Age 8-9 10-11 12-13 14-15 16-17
Users 21% 26% 32% 30% 14%
Id. at 3; see also Darmstradter, supra note 20, at 25 (noting an Emory Univ. Dental School study of
500 Atlanta boys, age 10 to 16 showing 15% chewed, 11% used snuff, while only 4.5% smoked);
Wallis, supra note 3 (noting Texas study showing 55% of users started before age 13); Jean, Smoke-
less Tobacco Public Enemy No. 1, Orlando Sentinel, July 7, 1985, at G7, col. 2 (quoting the Surgeon
9
McNamara: Smokeless Tobacco: Defective Marketing Creates a New Toxic Tort
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1985
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 21:499
common even among grade school students.6 9 The industry has only
recently taken some limited action in response to this phenomenon of
usage by minors. For example, the industry has agreed not to use adver-
tisements featuring athletes who have competed since 1975, and the U.S.
Tobacco Co. agreed not to advertise smokeless during the last Super
Bowl.
C. The Method: Advertise and Addict
The blood nicotine concentrations within ten minutes after using
snuff is about the same as that after having smoked a cigarette.70 One
tobacco executive has been widely quoted as admitting, "once a kid's
hooked, he doesn't leave."71 There is no real debate; nicotine is an addic-
tive drug.7 2
The industry admits that it is targeting the eighteen to twenty-four
year old age group.73 The U.S. Tobacco Co. alone had over 400 college
campus representatives promoting its smokeless products and spent over
General: 22% of I lth graders use smokeless); Genz, Use of Smokeless Starts with Children in Flor-
ida Area, Tulsa World, Mar. 20, 1985, at B, col. 1 (noting widespread use, and reports of first use as
young as 3 or 4); Smokeless Health Threat, Tulsa World, Nov. 26, 1984, at A10, col. I (citing an
Oklahoma survey claiming 22% of 11th graders are using snuff).
69. As the Marsee case demonstrates, use by elementary school-age students has been going on
for a while. See, eg., Christen, McDaniel & Doran, Snuff Dipping and Tobacco Chewing in a Group
of Texas College Athletes, 97 TEX. DENTAL J. 6 (1979) (study of 14 users for average of five years
included three who had been using since age 10-12).
70. g., Smith, supra note 54, at 454 & table 2; see Darmstadter, supra note 20, at 27; Wallis,
supra note 3, at 68.
71. See 132 CONG. RFc. H243, H245 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1986) (citing official industry statements
and ad content); Glover, Christen & Henderson, Just a Pinch Between the Cheek and Gum, 51 J.
SCH. HEALTH 415, 415 (1981).
72. See NIH STATEMENT, supra note 8, at H244-45 (noting physical, psychological, and behav-
ioral effects of smokeless nicotine addiction); Interviews with Univ. of Tulsa College of Law students
who use smokeless regularly, in Tulsa, Oklahoma (March 11-25, 1985). Of these users, 14 of 15
stated they found smokeless to be habit forming. Three of these students have had oral surgery for
problems associated with the habit. See generally supra note 8; Bone, Phillips & Chowdury, The
Smoking Habit: Physical Dependence on Nicotine, 2 J. REG. Dis. 10 (1981) (cited in FTC PETITION,
supra note 21, at 5 n.18).
It is interesting to note that there is no nicotine or addiction warning mandated by the upcom-
ing federal legislation. Evidently, this was part of the cost of industry acquiescence to the bill. The
industry supported the bill for the stated purpose of avoiding the problems inherent in complying
with numerous nonuniform state laws. 132 CONG. REc. H245, H247 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1986) Bill
sponsor Representative Mike Synar described the omission of a nicotine warning as a "casualty to
compromise." Id. at H250. He went on to state, "[tihe substitution of warning labels should in no
way be interpreted as an acknowledgment of ambiguity in the evidence on the addictive nature of
smokeless tobacco. That evidence is clear and irrefutable." Id. at H252.
73. See FTC PETrIoN, supra note 21, at 6-7; see also Maxwell, Chewing, Snuff is Growth Seg-
ment, 107 ToDAcco REP. 32 (1980); Dougherty, Moving Smokers to Snuff, N.Y. Times, Jan. 13,
1984, at D4, col. 1; Salamon, Many College Men Now Get Something Worth Chewing On, Wall St. J.,
May 22, 1979, at 1, col. 3.
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$30 million on promotions in 1984.74 Their advertising approach in-
cludes sponsoring college spring break programs, endorsements by fa-
mous athletes and musicians, sponsoring a racing team, and sexual
connotations in advertisements. 75 These ads not only fail to mention any
health risks associated with smokeless, but also show the use of smoke-
less as being consistent with an active and healthy lifestyle. The implica-
tions of some advertising, despite attempts to be subtle, is that smokeless
is a safe alternative to cigarettes.76 The headline of one advertisement
read, "[t]ake a pouch instead of a puff."77 The advertisement continued:
"A lot of smokers want to enjoy tobacco-but don't want to light up.
[Smokeless] is an easy alternative. You'll get real tobacco pleasure with-
out lighting up. It's a taste you'll like anytime, anywhere. We think
you'll like taking a pouch instead of a puff."78
Undeniably, the dramatic decrease in smoking has resulted due to
health concerns.7 9 Presumably, most would also agree that chewing and
spitting tobacco can hardly be considered more attractive, pleasant, or
sophisticated than smoking. So why has there been a recent crossover
from cigarettes to smokeless? While marketing efforts must be credited
with making smokeless more desirable to consumers, it must also be rec-
ognized that the relative change is partly due to health-risk perceptions.
It seems incredulous to suggest that smokeless consumers have actually
made a cognitive decision to risk oral cancer rather than lung cancer. By
encouraging the use of smokeless (which lacks a cancer warning) as an
alternative to cigarettes (which has a cancer warning), the industry com-
mits a form of deceptive advertising. Arguably, they are deliberately at-
tempting to exploit and encourage the misperception that smokeless is
less dangerous.
74. E.g., Darmstadter, supra note 20, at 25; Letter from A. Greenberg, Esq., and S.M. Wolfe,
M.D., of P.C.H.R.G. to J.C. Miller III, Chairman of the F.T.C. at 2 (Feb. 14, 1984).
75. See FTC PETITION Supp., supra note 68, at 4-13.
76. "I am extremely concerned that the tobacco industry implies in advertising that smokeless
tobacco is a safe alternative to smoking." Warnings Urged on Snuff, Chewing Tobacco, Tulsa World,
February 7, 1985, at A5, col. 3 (Assistant U.S. Surgeon General Robert Mecklenburg testifying in
favor of the Massachusetts warning).
77. Cover of smokeless product Skoal Bandits distributed as free samples by the U.S. Tobacco
Co., copy included in FTC PETITION SuPP., supra note 68, at 11.
78. FTC PETITION SuPP., supra note 68, at 11.
79. Called "the major single cause of cancer mortality in the U.S." by the Surgeon General,
smoking caused over 129,000 deaths in America in 1982. See AMERICAN CANCER Soc'Y, FIFry
MosT OFTEN ASKED QuEsTIONs ABouT SMOKING AND HEALTH ... AND THE ANSWERS 6 (pam-
phlet no. 2023-LE 1982). Approximately two million Americans stop smoking every year and
surveys show 85% of all smokers would like to quit. Id at 17; see also AMERICAN CANCER SOC'Y,
DANGERS OF SMOKING, BENEFITS OF QUITTING 63-69 (booklet no. 2052, 1980) (providing con-
sumption statistics showing dramatic decrease in use even 5 years ago).
1986]
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Consumer perceptions about the risks of a product are greatly influ-
enced by industry conduct or the lack thereof. Accordingly, the industry
should be held accountable for their chosen marketing methods. Fur-
thermore, it should be noted that a heightened duty to market in a rea-
sonable manner seems appropriate when the product is one which is
addictive or habit forming.
III. PRODUCT LIABILITY THEORY
The products liability area of modem tort law is characterized by
varying stages of evolution among jurisdictions.80 The courts search the
limits of liability and create this body of law on a case by case basis,8 '
considering a variety of public policy goals.8" The concepts underlying
the varying theories83 are often interrelated much to the frustration of
those with taxonomic minds. Consideration of the possible theories sup-
porting recovery in a smokeless suit will demonstrate this point. How-
ever, before considering the basic tort theories and the particular issue of
failure to warn, it is notable that the first smokeless case is only now in
process.
84
A. The Marsee 5 Case
The first smokeless case against a tobacco company was filed in fed-
80. Scott, Products Liability, 1982 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 709 (1983); see Gerber & Conway, A
Survey of State Products Liability Legislation, TRIAL, Nov. 1981, at 92.
81. Comment, Strict Liability and the Tortious Failure to Warn, 11 N. Ky. L. REV. 409, 410
(1984) (quoting Dean Prosser's expressions as to the uncertain limits of strict liability).
Widely cited articles by well-known authorities include: Gilmore, Products Liability: A Com-
mentary, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 109 (1970); Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law-
A Review of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REv. 579, 579-80 (1980) (citing 13 other publications on
product liability by Keeton); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50
MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966); Traynor, The Ways and Means of Defective Products and Strict Liability,
32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 49 Miss.
L.J. 825 (1973).
82. See, eg., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1977); Shapo, A Repre-
sentational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine, Function and Legal Liability for Product Dis-
appointment, 60 VA. L. REV. 1109, 1371-86 (1974) (evaluating policy goals of (1) incentives for
production of useful goods, (2) accident prevention, (3) loss distribution, (4) division of lawmaking
functions, (5) economic stability, (6) controlling a base of power, (7) justice, and (8) respect for the
law); see also Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 681
(1980).
83. There are four possible theories of recovery under modem product liability law according
to the leading hombook on torts: (1) strict liability in contract for breach of warranty, (2) negligence
liability in contract for breach of warranty of workmanlike construction or design, (3) negligence
liability for physical harm to persons and things, and (4) strict liability in tort largely for physical
harm to person and things. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, LAW OF TORTS § 95 (5th ed. 1984).
84. See infra text accompanying notes 254-62.
85. Complaint, Marsee v. United States Tobacco Co., No. Civ.-84-2777R (W.D. Okla. filed
[Vol. 21:499
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eral court on November 13, 1984, by Betty Ann Marsee on behalf of her
son Sean, who died an agonizing death from oral cancer at the age of
nineteen.8 6 He had used snuff since the age of twelve.87 Sean, a star high
school athlete who did not smoke,88 had a particular awareness of the
importance of a healthy lifestyle, having quit school for a year to help
care for his father who was suffering from a fatal heart disease.89 The
seven-month period from when Sean's cancer was first diagnosed until
three weeks before his death, when he was told his prognosis was termi-
nal, is a tragic story of human pain and suffering.9"
The Marsee suit is an extraordinary lawsuit for two reasons. First,
having already attracted considerable coverage by the media,91 the case
may become something of a legal "cause celebre." The position of the
tobacco industry is that a warning label on their product is both unwar-
ranted and unnecessary. 92 Their public position has been that the salient
issue is whether there is legal duty to warn of a "scientific controversy"
and how such a duty should be defined.93 It is hard to believe that a jury
anywhere, upon review of the available evidence, could find such a claim
persuasive since there simply is no "scientific controversy."
One side views this as a case of corporate irresponsibility, immoral-
Mar. 21, 1985) (filed by Dania Deschamps-Braly of Braly & Braly, P.C., of Ada, Okla., also
available from Public Citizen, Health Research Group).
86. Id.
87. Id. Mrs. Marsee is now personally committed to a campaign to educate young people and
their parents about the risks of smokeless. E.g., Warnings Urged on Snuff, Chewing Tobacco, Tulsa
World, Feb. 7, 1985, at A5, col. 2 (regarding hearings before Mass. Pub. Health Dept. panel); Inter-
view on CBS News Program 60 Minutes, aired Feb. 2, 1985; Announcement from Public Citizen,
Health Research Group, Nov. 13, 1984.
88. See generally Fincher, supra note 24, at 110-16 (describing Sean's life and the ordeal of his
death).
89. Sean worked to help support the family during this period. See Complaint, supra note 85,
at 11. Sean's mother, a registered nurse, has repeatedly claimed Sean stated his belief that smokeless
was safe, and had he known differently, he would have adjusted his conduct accordingly. Newspa-
pers and national magazines have also given press to the story. E.g., Fincher, supra note 24, at 110;
Wallis, supra note 3, at 68.
90. Marsee endured surgery three times: first, to remove one-third of this tongue; secondly, a
radical removal of the lymph nodes of the neck; and finally, removal of the right side of his jaw. He
suffered terribly from the effects of radiation treatment and chemotherapy and lived the final months
of his life breathing and eating through tubes. Complaint, supra note 85, at 5-8.
91. The case has been noted repeatedly by all three of the major networks, and was the basis for
a segment on the CBS news program 60 Minutes, aired Feb. 2, 1985. The case has also commanded
the attention of the Federal Trade Commission. Letter from Mr. Wolfe, M.D. and Mr. Greenberg,
Esq., both of Public Citizen, Health Research Group, to James C. Miller III, Chairman of the F.T.C.
(Nov. 28, 1984) and letter response from Carol J. Crawford, Director of Bureau of Consumer Pro-
duction, F.T.C., (Dec. 14, 1984).
92. Telephone interview with Gail Balph, Smokeless Tobacco Council (Feb. 11, 1985); see
supra note 11.
93. See supra note 11.
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ity, and exploitation at its worst. In their view, the industry is pandering
a product to young people which it knows is deadly-thus perpetuating a
condemnable fraud.94 On the other side, the industry view may be sum-
marized by the quip that social reformers would next have the courts
hold Elsie the cow liable for heart disease caused by cholesterol.95
Hence, the case is a classic example of a court facing the task of setting
public policy, balancing equity, and allocating economic burdens. In
short, the courts are being called upon to further consumer law and so-
cial policy. Many observers debate whether courts are adequately
equipped to handle such matters.96
Secondly, the Marsee case is a law professor's dream case; it
abounds with academic questions. It is actually a simple case of failure
to warn; the vital questions are factual, not legal. However, the case ex-
emplifies a number of legal questions. Examples of the legal issues in-
clude: (1) the use of statistics and the definitions, burdens, and limits of
strict liability,97 (2) if proof of failure to warn effectively turns a strict
liability suit into a negligence action,9" (3) the role of punitives in prod-
ucts liability,99 (4) the limits of industry liability under Sindell v. Abbott
94. Such is the position of the Public Citizen Health Research Group as evidenced by their
F.T.C. Petition. See FTC PETITION, supra note 21, at 9-11.
95. See Will, Addiction to Litigation Grows, Tulsa World, Feb. 11, 1985, at A4, col. 5. Will
criticizes attorney Melvin Belli's pursuit of cigarette cases as a denial of the individual's responsibil-
ity for his own behavior. Id; see also Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 317 F.2d 19, 38 n.40 (5th
Cir. 1963); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402 comments i & j (1977).
96. E.g., R. REEVES, AMERICAN JOURNEY 98-101 (1982) (Interview with former Supreme
Court Justice Potter Stewart who laments, "[The courts] are inadequate. Society expects too much
now. There are too many larger questions here-moral, social, political, economic. We have been
given power beyond the ken of the courts... The courts became strong because of a default of the
other branches of government.").
A case so threatening to the tobacco industry as is the Marsee case, certainly has political
overtones. See, eg., Sapolsky, The Political Obstacles to the Control of Cigarette Smoking in the
United States, 5 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 277 (1980). Former President Jimmy Carter, regret-
ting the lack of political and professional concern for the problem, has recently proposed that the
Carter Center of Emory University be used as clearing house for lawsuits against tobacco companies.
See Carter Pushes Fight on Health Problems, Tulsa World, Dec. 2, 1984, at A14, col. 3. See generally
S. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF CANCER (1979).
97. See generally SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TORT LIAB. Sys., REPORT TO THE A.B.A., TO-
WARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INQUIRY, THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTAN-
TIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW, at ch. 4-71 to -85 (mass production and modem
advertising), ch. 5-88 to -108 (crucial controversies in product liability), ch. 5-137 to -163 (role of
experts and res ipsa loquitor), ch. 9-1 to -21 (empirical questions, effects of rules on risky behavior)
(1984).
For a good summary of the discussion of the burdens and limits in products liability, see K.
Ross & B. WRUBEL, PRODUCTS LIABILITY OF MANUFACTURERS: PREVENTION AND DEFENSE
1985, at 11-191 (1985).
98. See infra text and accompanying notes 142-56.
99. See infra text and accompanying notes 172-73, 213-21.
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Laboratories,"° (5) the lateit/patent danger analysis,10' (6) the limits to
the duty to research, 02 (7) pandering to young people, 03 (8) misleading
advertising which implies safety,"° and (9) the duties created by the ad-
dictive nature of a product. °1
As already suggested, the eventual disposition of the Marsee case
will probably be decided upon existing legal concepts. Plaintiff's counsel
has no desire to create new law, 0 6 relying primarily on a failure to warn
theory.107 Simplicity being one strategic goal, they omitted a warranty
claim.'08 A physician familiar with the case displayed good insight when
summarizing the case by analogy to the Scopes Monkey Trial.1 09 It is
predicted that the defense will rely heavily on their ability to discredit
science. It is likely they will argue, in effect, that since current science
cannot explain with any specificity how cancer is contracted, there can be
no valid claim of cancer causation. 110 However, such an argument has
100. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (Cal. 1980), cert denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980) (shifting burden to multiple drug manufacturer defendants constituting majority of market.).
Sean Marsee used only one brand of snuff-Skoal, and his attorneys are suing only the manu-
facturer of that product. See Complaint, supra note 85. However, one could argue that Sean was a
victim of the marketing of smokeless as done by the entire industry, since none of the manufacturers
provide warnings. Some courts have relied upon a "substantial factor" doctrine, holding any defend-
ant liable for the full extent of damages to the victim. E.g., J. TRAUBERMAN, STATUTORY REFORM
OF "Toxic TORTS": RELIEVING LEGAL, SCIENTIFIC AND ECONOMIC BURDENS ON THE CHEMI-
CAL VICTIM 88 (Envtl. Law Inst. 1983).
A break-down of the company market share in the smokeless industry is provided in FTC
PETITION, supra note 21, at 8-9, tables 2-3 (U.S. Tobacco Co. sells about 90% of all U.S. sold snuff,
but only 22% of whole U.S. smokeless market).
101. One might reasonably ask if consumers shouldn't know better than to habitually put to-
bacco or any thing else in their mouth and leave it there. Fortunately, the law recognizes such an
inquiry as hedging the real question. See, eg., Henderson, The Demise of the Patent Danger Rule, 3
CORP. L. REV. 78 (1980); Marschall, An Obvious Wrong Does Not Make a Right: Manufacturer's
Liability for Patently Dangerous Products, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1065, 1077 (1973); Philo, New Dimen-
sions in the Tortious Failure to Warn, TRIAL, Nov. 1981, at 40, 44 (1981) ("if there has been an
expression in law comparable to, '[t]he moon is made of green cheese,' it is '[t]he danger is open and
obvious.' ").
102. See, eg., Spradley, Defensive Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict Products Liability, 67
MINN. L. REV. 343, 367-98, 433-37.
103. See, eg., supra notes 68-69 (indicating the scope of addiction among minors).
104. E.g., Smith v. Borg Warner Corp., 626 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1980).
105. See Garner, supra note 14, at 1437-40 (inadequacy of addiction warning as a theory of
liability).
106. Interview with George Braly, attorney of Braly & Braly of Ada, Okla., in Ada, Okla. (Oct.
10, 1985).
107. Id.; Complaint, supra note 85, at 8.
108. See Complaint, supra note 85.
109. Interview with George Braly, attorney of Braly & Braly of Ada, Okla., in Ada, Okla. (Oct.
10, 1985).
110. See supra note 11.
The tobacco industry is once again lifting a cry that nothing should be done, nor even a
whisper a caution be advised, because there is yet no ultimate proof. Is it necessary to be
silent until the number of people who have massive oral tissue destruction and loss of life
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the potential for backfire. In effect, the defense lawyers will be attempt-
ing to sell the same reasoning which caused the marketeers to be dragged
into court in the first place. Their message is that same inane idea which
most of us have at one time or another uttered with a shrug-"every-
thing causes cancer." This shallow plea in the face of hard evidence is
likely to be received as insulting or offensive, resulting in jury resentment
or even anger. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the inconsistent positions
taken by the tobacco industry will be lost on the jury. It will be easy for
the plaintiff to show that the tobacco industry has taken a public stance
encouraging the use of smokeless without any acknowledgment of the
special risks. This position certainly makes courtroom claims of a known
controversy or assumed-risk appear unjustifiable.
B. Warranty
Strict liability in contract for breach of an implied warranty is a
theory of recovery largely replaced by strict tort liability. It nevertheless
has a distinguishing basis 1 and therefore may be used as a supplemental
or fall-back theory. 2 The common law warranty action, as now codi-
fied in the U.C.C., 13 originated not to provide security from dangerous
products or conduct, but to hold sellers responsible for the quality of
becomes so large that the problem is glaringly obvious to everyone, except those who
profit?
Warnings Urged on Snuff, Chewing Tobacco, Tulsa World, Feb. 7, 1985, at A5, col. 2 (quoting
Assistant U.S. Surgeon General R. Micklenburg testimony in Massachusetts hearing on warnings.).
111. The focus in strict liability is on the condition of the product. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 83, §§ 98-99. The focus in negligence is on the defendant's conduct. Id. § 96 (discussing
conduct and duty). In a warranty action, the issue is the allocation of risk under the contract, a
representational theory. Id. §§ 95a, 97.
112. See, eg., Rasor, The History of Warranties of Quality in the Sale of Goods: Contract or
Tort?-A Study in Full Circles, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 175, 175-76, 205 & n.222 (1982) (common law
implied warranty merely supplanted by U.C.C. section and 402A, discussed in context of applicabil-
ity of statute of limitations and comparative negligence).
113. U.C.C. § 2-314 states as follows:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be
merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect
to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving for value of food or drink to be
consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the descrip-
tion; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality
and quantity within each unit and among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may re-
quire; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the container or
label if any.
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their goods. 114 The confusion arises from the fact that this basis has been
used as a stepping stone in the evolution of the tort of strict liability from
negligence and breach of warranty for cases involving personal injury.' 15
Warranty language and theory continue to be used in some jurisdictions
for personal injury suits, prompting debate as to its necessity and propri-
ety in light of the 'preempting' adoptions of the U.C.C. and section 402A
of the Restatement of Torts.
116
If a breach of warranty theory is permissible, it might be used in
conjunction with other theories if for no other reason than for the per-
(3) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316) other implied warranties may arise
from course of dealing or usage of trade.
Id.
U.C.C. § 2-315 states as follows:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose
for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judg-
ment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless excluded or modified under the next
section an implied warranty that the goods shall be fit for such purpose.
Id.; see also U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (limitation on personal injury damage is prima facie unconscionable).
114. W. PROSSER & IV. KEETON, supra note 82, § 95A.
115. Id. §§ 97-98.
The history of breach of an implied warranty is not a simple story. It originated in tort theory,
evolved into a contract theory, again drifted into use as a tort theory as noted above, and now in
light of the arrival of § 402A will again most probably be limited to contract actions and economic
harm. For an extensive consideration of the historical development, see, e.g., Birnbaum, Unmasking
the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence (to Warranty) to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND.
L. REv. 593, 593-602 (1980); Llewellyn, Of Warranty of Quality and Society, 36 COLUM. L. REv.
699 (1936); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J.
1099, 1124-34 (1960); Prosser, The Implied Warranty of Merchantable Quality, 27 MINN. L. REv.
117, 118-22 (1943); Rasor, supra note 112.
116. The current relevance of breach of an implied warranty to a personal injury suit has been
considered by several commentators. E.g., Murray, Products Liability v. Warranty Claims: Untan-
gling The Web, 3 J. L. & COM. 269 (1983) (arguing convincingly for "symmetry" in the law between
assumpsit, warranty and § 402A); Rasor, supra note 112 (noting the confusing simultaneous applica-
tions of contract, warranty and § 402A in Kansas); Wade, Tort Liability for Products Causing Physi-
cal Injury andArticle 2 of the UCC., 48 Mo. L. Rav. 1, 3-4 n.l1 (1983) (citing eight articles which
argue Article 2 pre-empts the tort of strict liability for products and thus precludes judicial develop-
ment, and seven articles arguing no preclusion); see also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 83,
§ 101 (concluding commercial codes should be amended to exclude personal injury in light of
§ 402A).
In short, whether a warranty theory is still useful in any jurisdiction boils down to two ques-
tions as to the statutes and case law of the jurisdiction: whether the early personal injury cases,
notably food and drink cases, are pre-empted by strict tort liability and therefore no longer reliable
on a warranty theory, and whether commercial law providing for economic losses can be extended to
personal injury suits. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 83, § 95A n.14 (citing two early
impure chewing tobacco cases which split on the question whether smokeless was "consumable"); id.
§ 97 (noting strict liability for defective food and drink ran ahead of any clear legal justification,
noting case as early as 1913); see id. § 101 (summarizing the appropriate theories of recovery based
on the interest protected); see also [1] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH). 4016, at 4026-27. Two jurisdic-
tions utilize breach of warranty rather than adopting strict liability. Id. at 4026 n.3. Nine jurisdic-
tions have adopted a form of strict liability while 37 jurisdictions have adopted § 402A, and three
jurisdictions reject strict liability. Id. at 4026-27. One jurisdiction has indicated breach of warranty
supersedes strict liability. Id. at 4026 n.2.
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suasive value which the authority of the commercial statute language
might have with the jury.I17
The legal arguments for liability under a warranty theory are as fol-
lows. It has been black letter law for two centuries that a merchant, by
virtue of the sale alone, impliedly warrants the quality of the goods."'
The seller becomes an insurer of the fitness of the goods for their ordi-
nary purpose and for the particular purpose of the purchaser in those
instances where the seller knows the buyer is relying on the seller's skill,
judgment, or knowledge." 9
The smokeless user might proceed under at least two warranty theo-
ries. The first theory is that a warranty arises from the sale. The seller
should be liable since the product is not fit for its ordinary use by virtue
of having caused the personal injury. The "product" would be the sum
of the consumed smokeless. As a second theory, the plaintiff might ac-
knowledge that the product may be fit for its ordinary purpose, but claim
an implied warranty arises from the buyer's reliance on the seller's lack
of a warning and the seller's advertising. The harm follows from the
company's failure to warn that the use of smokeless may cause cancer
among a known class of users: those individuals having an unknown
susceptibility to cancer. 2 °
The tobacco industry has been successful in defending against suits
claiming injuries caused by the indigenous components of tobacco smoke
which were based on a recovery theory of breach of an implied warranty
of merchantability.' 2' In Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,1 22 the
action was dismissed for failure to allege that the cigarette-induced lung
117. See supra note 113 (U.C.C. Language).
118. See Bogert & Fink, Business Practices Regarding Warranties in the Sale of Goods, 25 ILL. L.
REV. 400, 415 (1931) (cited in W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 83, § 95A).
119. Id.; see also supra note 113 (U.C.C. § 2-315).
120. It is unknown if cancer results from an individual's susceptibility, or if the risk is present for
all and results due to the fortutious presence of some other factor. Until such a distinction can be
made, the defective marketing of a product cannot be defended merely because the particular vic-
tim's harm was not predictable. A contrary view would insulate a gunman who shoots randomly
into a crowd.
121. For a summary, see Garner, supra note 14, at 1425-31, 1431 n.67 (1980); Wegman, Ciga-
rettes and Health: A Legal Analysis, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 678 (1966); see also James, The Untoward
Effects of Cigarettes and Drugs: Some Reflections on Enterprise Liability, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1550
(1966); White, Strict Liability of Cigarette Manufacturers and Assumption of Risk, 29 LA. L. REV.
589 (1969).
122. 427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970). The issue of statutory limitation was considered under an
interlocutory appeal. The court found a continuing tort for which the continuing damage would toll
the one year limit. Therefore, the statute would not run until the plaintiff knew or should have
known of his injury and that the injury was caused by smoking. R.J. Reynolds v. Hudson, 314 F.2d
776, 780-82 (5th Cir. 1963).
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cancer was foreseeable by the defendant. 23 In Green v. American To-
bacco Co.,124 however, the federal Court of Appeals held that knowledge
was not a prerequisite to liability in an implied warranty action.125 The
court found that the plaintiff's lung cancer had been caused by smok-
ing.1 26 However, the defendant prevailed since the defendant's product
was found to have met a "reasonable fitness" standard.'2 7 That standard
required proof of a significant number of other tobacco induced deaths or
injuries. 12  Finally, in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., t 29 a
federal court held that cigarettes would be deemed unmerchantable upon
proof of causation in the plaintiff's case alone."' 0 That plaintiff, how-
ever, chose not to pursue the action (after a reversal of a finding of as-
sumed risk) due to problems of proof.'3 While the industry has yet to
lose a case, 32 the law may eventually provide for recovery based on war-
ranty. Suits are still pending, and a strict liability theory is presently
being attempted for the first time.133
In addition to the tobacco cases, there is additional common law
support for implied breach of warranty for failure to warn of a risk of
123. Hudson, 427 F.2d 541, 541-42 (5th Cir. 1970) (citing Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963)). The Lartigue opinion provides a good discussion of negligence,
warranty and strict tort liability, and disputed the claim that requirements of knowledge and for-
seeability turned the warranty question into one of negligence. "[T]he foreseeability here involved is
different from that required in negligence cases. It is not the forseeability of unreasonable risks, but
rather the forseeability of the kinds of risks which the enterprise is likely to create." Lartigue, 317
F.2d at 24 (quoting James, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 24 TENN. L. Rav. 923, 925 (1957)).
The basic holding in Lartigue is "cigarette smokers who started smoking before the great cancer-
smoking debate cannot rely on tobacco companies' "warranty" that their cigarettes had no carcino-
genic element; the manufacturer is not an insurer against the unknowable." Id. at 21.
124. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962), question certified on rehearing, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963), rev'd
and remanded, 325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), rev'd and remanded on rehearing, 391 F.2d 97 (5th Cir.
1968), rev'd per curiam, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (en banc), cert denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970).
125. Green, 154 So. 2d 169, 171 (Fla. 1963).
126. Green, 391 F.2d 97, 99 (5th Cir. 1968).
127. Id. at 102.
128. Id.
129. 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961), affd on rehearing, 350 F.2d 479 (3d Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 987 (1966), modified, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert denied, 386 U.S. 1009 (1967).
130. Pritchard, 295 F.2d at 296.
131. See Garner, supra note 14, at 1427 (noting that ostensibly the case might have been won on
an implied warranty theory; curiously, the case was pursued on express warranty and negligence
theories before being voluntarily discontinued).
132. Id. at 1425.
133. E.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J. 1984) (noted in Blodgett,
Standing to Sue, Sick Smokers Get the Green Light, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1984, at 40). At the time of this
writing, there are about 40 cigarette cases pending nationally. Letter from R.A. Daynard, Co-chair-
man, Tobacco Products Liability Project and Editor of Tobacco Products Liability Reporter (Oct. 9,
1985) (mass mailing, soliciting subscriptions to the reporter). See generally Brody, Recovery Against
Tobacco Companies, TRIAL, Nov. 1985, at 49.
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cancer or other serious personal injury.134 The asbestos cases provide
some precedent. 13 5 Other types of cases which provide precedent are
drugs,136 pesticides and herbicides,137 intrauterine contraceptive de-
vices, 138 and various other products. 139
While a warranty theory is subject to numerous defenses, many
courts make the warranty theory more attractive by limiting such de-
fenses where personal injury is involved. 140 A warranty action does not
require a showing of a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" as
in strict products liability. Furthermore, a warranty theory often pro-
vides for a longer statute of limitations than tort once the harm becomes
apparent.14 1 Therefore, a warranty claim can be much more than mere
"petition padding."
C. A Three-Category Analysis of Foreseeability
All product liability theories require that the product defect cause
134. See, eg., Case Comment, The Duty to Warn Within the Implied Warranty of
Merchantability: Reid v. Eckerds Drugs, Inc., 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 747 passim (1980) (failure to warn
constitutes breach).
135. E.g., Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales, 681 F.2d 334, 341-44 (5th Cir. 1982); Borel v.
Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1087, 1091 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 934
(1974); cf Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. Co., 533 F. Supp. 183, 191-92 (S.D. Ga. 1982)
(warranty claim dismissed for lack of privity); Large v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 524 F. Supp. 285, 285-86
(E.D. Va. 1981), affid, 707 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1983) (where quarry machine operator established
respiratory disease and hearing loss from a two week exposure period, action barred since not filed
within two years of time injury evident).
136. E.g., Goodman v. Mead Johnson & Co., 534 F.2d 566, 568-71 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1038 (1977) (cancer death due to thromophlebitis; action not barred by statute of limitation
until two years after discovery or knowledge of injury); Annot., 2 A.L.R. 4th 1091 (1980) (discussion
of diethylstilbestrol (DES) cases).
137. See Annot., 12 A.L.R. 4th 463 (1982) (discussing product liability for fertilizers, insecti-
cides, pesticides, fungicides, weed killers and application articles).
138. See Hawkinson v. A.H. Robins Co., 595 F. Supp. 1290, 1312-14 (D. Colo. 1984) (Dalkon
Shield cases consolidated, some plaintiffs' actions on implied warranty theory dismissed for failure to
give seller timely notice of the breach).
139. E.g., Klein v. Council of Chem. Ass'ns, 587 F. Supp. 213, 225 (E.D. Pa. 1984) (warranty
action dismissed due to lack of a finding of a "product," where a printing industry worker alleged his
bladder cancer was due to exposure to certain chemicals). See generally Locke, Sales: Implied War-
ranty of Fitness for Particular Purpose, 27 AM. JUR. P.O.F.2D 243, 269-72 (1981) (article cites a long
list of products which have been recognized under warranty); Locke, Sales: Implied Warranty of
Merchantability, 26 AM. JUR. P.O.F.2D 1, 32-34 (1981) (provides cites to cases supporting long list
of products).
140. If not an anachronism in a period of strict liability, it is said that an action based on an
implied warranty concept "carries far too much luggage in the way of undesirable complications,
and is more trouble than it is worth." The "luggage" referred to is the legal issue of damage limita-
tions, privity, disclaimers, and notice of breach. While there is no disclaimer (warning) defense with
smokeless, the other obstacles should be considered by jurisdiction. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 83, §§ 97-98; see B. CLARK & C. SMITH, THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES, f
7.07(7), 20.08(1).
141. B. CLARK & C. SMITH supra note 140, at 7.07(7).
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the injury.142 In over 700 reported federal cases, a failure to warn has
been argued to be a defect.143 However, a strong difference of opinion
exists over whether knowledge or foreseeability of the risk should be re-
quired to impose strict liability upon a manufacturer. 1" Asserting what
he believes to be the generally accepted view, Professor Keeton takes the
position 145 that:
[A] claimant who seeks recovery on this basis must... prove that the
manufacturer-defendant was negligent. There will be no liability with-
out a showing that the defendant designer knew or should have known
in the exercise of ordinary care of the risk or hazard about which he
failed to warn. Moreover, there will be no liability unless [the] manu-
facturer failed to take the precautions that a reasonable person would
take in presenting the product to the public. Although this ground of
recovery is sometimes referred to as strict liability, it is really nothing
more than a ground of negligence liability described as the sale of a
product in a defective condition, subject, however, only to the defenses
and other limitations on liability applicable to strict liability rather
than negligence.
146
This position is frequently rationalized by the often-repeated phrase
that "strict liability is not absolute liability."147 Keeton explains that "it
would be extending strict liability too far to require a manufacturer to
bear the costs of accidents to a few who were victimized by an unknow-
able risk of a good product that was a boon to humanity-such as when
penicillin was first marketed."1 4 ' Arguably, strict liability is a "dubious
social policy" which impedes the development of products.149
142. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 83, § 97. See generally J. ALLEE, PRODUCT LiA-
BILITY (1984) (providing analysis of the comparative advantages and disadvantages of a suit based in
breach of warranty, as compared with strict liability); Phillips, A Synopsis of the Developing Law of
Products Liability, 28 DRAKE L. REv. 317, 320-29 (1978).
143. LEXIs, Feb. 15, 1985, Genfed library, Dist file.
144. See infra notes 145-56, 205 and accompanying text; see also W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 83, § 99 nn.20-21; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i (1977) (ex-
cuses liability for allergic reaction of plaintiff unless he/she was a member of a large foreseeable
class).
145. Keeton has changed his position on this issue. Compare Keeton, Product Liability-Inade-
quacy of Information, 48 TEx. L. REv. 398, 404 (1970) (knowledge unimportant) with Keeton, The
Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law--A Review of Basic Principles, 45 Mo. L. REv. 579,
586-87 (1980) (negligence required). See generally Brodeur, Annuals of Law (Asbestos-Part I), THE
NEW YORKER, June 10, 1985, at 49, 96-100 (Keeton's inconsistency on this issue was noted by the
Fifth Circuit Court when Keeton unsuccessfully advocated a state-of-the-art defense in the famous
asbestos case, Borel v. Fibreboard).
146. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 83, § 99 (citation omitted).
147. E.g., Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, _, 402 N.E.2d 194, 196-200 (1980).
148. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 83, § 99.
149. See Note, Is There a Distinction Between Strict Liability and Negligence in Failure to Warn
Actions?, 15 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 983, 992 n.48 (1981) (citing Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk
Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 516 (1961) (strict liability impedes development
1986]
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A good summary of the reasoning of the opposing view can be found
in two student articles, 150 one of which also provides good documenta-
tion of the confficting case law.151 Under this view, the product without
a warning is evaluated for defectiveness regardless of whether the manu-
facturer had known of the defect.152 Therefore, if a manufacturer would
be negligent in failing to warn of the danger had he known of it, then
strict liability may be imposed.153 Advocates of this view believe that to
hold otherwise "effectively emasculate[s] the distinction between strict
liability and negligence."1 54 Hence, the controversy concerns the ele-
ment of fault, which is a concept having no place in pure strict liability
law.' Under strict liability, if the product is by its nature defective, the
focus should then shift to the sole consideration of whether the consumer
should fail to recover because of a defense of informed consent or as-
sumed risk.' 56
Whether the smokeless industry should be held liable for the ordi-
nary use of smokeless can be broken down into three inquiries discussed
below under the headings of negligence, strict liability, and absolute lia-
bility. The negligence inquiry considers the reasonableness of the manu-
facturers' conduct in producing and selling the product without a
warning. 5 7 Strict liability considers whether the product is unreasona-
bly dangerous without a warning or is otherwise defective, thus creating
an unreasonable danger.'58 Absolute liability theory considers whether
of products); Connolly, The Liability of a Manufacturer for Unknowable Hazards Inherent in His
Product, 32 INS. COuNS. J. 303, 307 (1965) (if the risk itself is unknown, it is incorrect to suggest the
seller is in a position to spread that risk); Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused
by Defects in Products--An Opposing View, 24 TENN. L. REv. 938, 947-48 (1957) (because strict
liability may force manufacturer to price product out of market by requiring a single group to bear
risk, it is a "dubious social policy")).
150. Comment, Strict Products Liability: The Irrelevance of Foreseeability and Related Negli-
gence Concepts, 14 TULSA L.J. 338, 356-59 (1978); Note, supra note 149.
151. E.g., Note, supra note 149, at 983 n.4, 997 n.68, 998-1002 nn.75-90.
152. Id. at 1000-01 (discussing Little v. PPG Indus., 19 Wash. App. 812, 821-22, 579 P.2d 940,
947 (1978), modified, 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979), and numerous supporting cases).
153. Id. at 999; see also K. Ross & B. WRUBEL, supra note 97, at 56-57.
154. See, e.g., Note, supra note 149, at 1000 passim (fault is a negligence concept and is irrele-
vant in strict liability actions).
155. Comment, supra note 150, at 343-45.
A supplier in strict liability should not be viewed as fulfilling or breaching a duty to the
plaintiff vis-a-vis the presence or absence of warnings. Rather, a warning may serve to
remove liability from the supplier by conveying such information as will make a user or
consumer fully and subjectively cognizant of the danger involved. The question then be-
comes whether the plaintiff's conduct amounted to assumption of risk.
Id. at 395.
156. Id.
157. See infra notes 160-73 and accompanying text.
158. See infra notes 174-221 and accompanying text.
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smokeless products are unreasonably dangerous even when a full disclo-
sure of the risk is given. 159 It can be argued that as a matter of social
policy, some products are so lacking in social value or utility that they
should be required to "pay their own way" irrespective of presumptions
of consumer assumption of risk.
1. Negligence
There are over seventy reported federal negligent "failure to warn"
cases involving cancer. 160 The elements of an action for negligent failure
to warn are set out in Restatement section 388161 and require a finding
that the supplier knew or should have known that the product was dan-
gerous for its intended use.1 62  Since the supplier is held to the most
current knowledge available regarding its product, 163 the smokeless in-
dustry is indeed hard pressed to deny such knowledge. Hence, where the
defect complained of is failure to warn, the plaintiff is not as disadvan-
taged as in many cases where the defendant controls the evidence needed
to prove the negligence or defect.
At this point it is appropriate to note that part of the novelty of a
smokeless action will be the manner in which the court copes with the
issue of whether, as a matter of law, there is a duty to warn of a "scien-
tific controversy."'" The no duty to warn of a controversy argument is
in effect an effort to confuse the separate issues of (1) causation 165 and
159. See infra notes 222-53 and accompanying text.
160. LEXis, Feb. 15, 1985, Genfed library, Dist file.
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 388 (1977) states as follows:
Chattel Known to be Dangerous for Intended Use
One who supplies directly or through a third person a chattel for another to use is
subject to liability to those whom the supplier should expect to use the chattel with the
consent of the other or to be endangered by its probable use, for physical harm caused by
the use of the chattel in the manner for which and by a person for whose use it is supplied,
if the supplier
(a) knows or has reason to know that the chattel is or is likely to be dangerous for
the use for which it is supplied, and
(b) has no reason to believe that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will
realize its dangerous condition, and
(c) fails to exercise reasonable care to inform them of its dangerous condition or of
the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.
Id.
162. Id.
163. E.g., Lindsay v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 637 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1980) (drug manu-
facturer held to the continuous duty of keeping abreast of current state of knowledge of its product);
see W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 83, § 96 (seller held to state of the art in sense of
scientific knowledge and technological information available).
164. See supra note 11.
165. Assertion that the lack of a warning was not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury
can be a successful defense in a failure to warn case. However, many courts hold that the absence of
1986]
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(2) the reasonableness of the manufacturer's conduct in the circum-
stances1 66 or the existence of a product defect. 167 Therefore, it would be
improper to permit such argument as an affirmative defense per se.
In addition to negligent failure to warn, a manufacturer of smoke-
less might be held to be negligent for other conduct, 16 such as the failure
to determine the dangerous propensities of its product,169 its unreasona-
ble method of advertising,7 0 and the failure to substitute the dangerous
contents of its products with safer ones.17 1 In general, a virtue of the
negligence-based product liability theory is that punitive awards are less
legally problematic, and juries may tend to grant larger awards.172 This
is particularly true when defective marketing is complained of since it is
an action which antecedes products liability. Defective marketing is an
action steeped in the tort concepts of fraud, deception by nondisclosure,
and wanton disregard for safety.' 73
2. Strict Liability
There are numerous strict products liability cases involving can-
cer.174 The primary authority is the Restatement section 402A and its
a warning gives rise to a presumption that had one been given, it would have been read and heeded.
K. Ross & B. WRUBEL, supra note 97, at 57-62.
Proof of actual causation is a major problem for individual plaintiffs in toxic tort suits. Causa-
tion is a question of fact, and circumstantial evidence of expert testimony and statistical proof may
carry the burden. See R. RHEINGOLD, N. LANDAU & M. CANAVAN, Toxic TORTS 31-33 (1977);
see also infra note 259.
166. "MIhe defendant is required to exercise the care of a reasonable person under the circum-
stances." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 83, § 96 (when a duty to warn arises); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 388(b), 402A comment i (1977).
167. See infra text accompanying notes 192-95.
168. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 83, § 96 (noting negligence may be found over
as broad an area as the whole preparing and selling area).
169. Id.
170. See supra notes 70-79 and accompanying text.
171. A good argument can be made that smokeless could be made much safer. Various chews
used around the world have been shown to pose significantly less risk. See supra note 42 and accom-
panying text.
172. See RESEARCH GROUP, INC., PRODUCT LIABILITY: LEGAL STUDY 116-17 nn.6-9 (1984);
J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE § 6.02 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
173. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1329
(1976) (citing five forms of marketing misbehavior warranting punitive damages).
174. A seminal case is Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1974).
See also Bolen v. Redman Homes, Nos. 83-1467, 83-1821, 83-1867, 84-1019, slip op. (5th Cir. Dec.
20, 1984); Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales, 737 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1984); Worsham v. A.H. Robins
Co., 734 F.2d 676 (11th Cir. 1984); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales, 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir. 1984),
reh'g granted, (July 2, 1984); Austin v. Unarco Indus., 705 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1247 (1983); Needham v. White Laboratories Inc., 639 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1981); "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D. N.Y. 1984), enforcing 506 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. N.Y.), rev'd,
635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980); Klein v. Council of Chem. Ass'ns, 587 F. Supp. 213 (E.D. Pa. 1984);
Johnston v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 351 (D. Kan. 1983); Neal v. Carey Can. Mines, 548 F. Supp.
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comments. 175 Section 402A requires a finding that the product was in a
"defective condition unreasonably dangerous."' 176 There is considerable
commentary available explaining how failure to warn qualifies as a defec-
tive condition, especially with regard to drug cases. 17 7 In addition to
several failure to warn theories, 178 smokeless may reasonably be consid-
ered defective by its designed chemical composition'79 or by virtue of the
357 (E.D. Pa. 1982), aff'd, 760 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1985); Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F. Supp. 1142
(N.D. Cal. 1982); Starling v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 533 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Ga. 1982); Mink v.
University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(A) (1977) which states as follows:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change
in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his prod-
uct, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any con-
tractual relation with the seller.
Id. Section 402A does not preclude proof of negligence; it provides an additional and concurrent
basis for recovery. Id. comment a.
176. See id. comment g (explaining defective condition); id. comment i (explaining unreasonably
dangerous). Several jurisdictions, such as California, have abandoned the modifying language "un-
reasonably dangerous." See Colley, Products Liability Litigation: Proof of Defects, TRIAL, Nov.
1981, at 72 n.4; Comment, Elimination of "Unreasonably Dangerous" from § 402A-The Price of
Consumer Safety?, 14 DUQ. L. REv. 25 (1975).
177. E.g., Bressler, The Warning Claim in an Arizona Products Liability Action: Limitations on
the Duty to Warn, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 395 (1983); Sales, The Duty to Warn and Instruct for Safe Use
in Strict Tort Liability, DEF. L.J., Sept. 1982, at 267 (a very comprehensive review); Swartz, The
Concepts of "Defective Condition" and "Unreasonably Dangerous" in Products Liability Law, 66
MARQ. L. REv. 280 (1983); Comment, Strict Liability and the Tortious Failure to Warn, 11 N. KY.
L. REV. 409 (1984).
Commentaries on drug cases in particular include Atkinson, Pharmaceutical Litigation: Pro-
moting Product Safety, TRIAL, Nov. 1981, at 50, 50 ("injuries and deaths due to adverse drug expo-
sure mount as the pharmaceutical industry enjoys access to a dependent market while operating with
only a fraction of the responsibility enforced upon other product manufacturers .... ); McClellan,
Tate & Eaton, Strict Liability for Prescription Drug Injuries: The Improper Marketing Theory, 26 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 1 (1981) (provides thorough discussion of historical evolutions and common law goals
in light of the industry regulation); Shandeil, Failure to Warn-A Drug Manufacturer's Liability, 14
TRIAL L. Q. 5 (1982) (summarizes holdings of major cases); Comment, The Failure to Warn Defect:
Strict Liability of the Prescription Drug Manufacturer in California, 17 U.S.F.L. REv. 743 (1983)
(§ 402A rejected as standard for design defect cases in California, but used in failure to warn cases).
178. Possible theories include failure to warn of the following: (1) cancer and other health risks,
(2) addictive nature, (3) methods of use to reduce risk, and also failure to make post-sale disclosures
to public.
179. Although beyond the scope of this Comment, a traditional defective design theory of recov-
ery may be a viable action for smokeless since studies of chews used throughout the world indicate
that chews or dip with less tobacco or none are safer for consumers. See, eg., supra note 42. This of
course raises questions as to the integrity of the "product." Is "product" constituted by the tobacco
itself or its function as a chew or dip? It is difficult to believe that the chemical composition cannot
be made less carcinogenic without destroying the product's utility.
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chosen advertising methods.1 0
As previously explained, foreseeability and negligence concepts are
still required in many strict liability suits based on the defect of failure to
warn. 8 However, when a manufacturer markets a product without an
adequate warning, a reseller is subject to liability without proof of negli-
gence for having resold the product without a warning. 18 2 In other
words, a convenience store may be held strictly liable for reselling smoke-
less upon proof that the wholesaler tobacco company was negligent in
failing to warn.
There are numerous legal reasons for requiring a warning: 18 3  to
notify of defects which cannot be eliminated during design or manufac-
ture 84 or hazards which the 'state of the art' has yet to remove; 85 to
notify of an otherwise flawless product's inherent dangers;18 6 and to pre-
vent use by unsuitable users. 8 7 The legal inquiry is similar regardless of
which reason is proffered for a required warning. However, confusion
over the concepts which differentiate negligent failure to warn from fail-
ure to warn as a defect in strict liability188 still obfuscates the requisite
elements of a strict liability suit.'8 9 It appears that those jurisdictions
which adhere to a requirement of knowledge or foreseeable risk under
section 402A 19° are in essence requiring a finding of a negligent breach of
180. See supra text accompanying notes 70-78.
181. "[Tlhere will be no liability unless [the] manufacturer failed to take precautions that a
reasonable person would take in presenting the product to the public." W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 83, § 99; see supra notes 142-59 and accompanying text.
182. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 83, § 99.
183. See Sales, supra note 177, at 276-88 (discussing types of risks that mandate a warning);
Note, supra note 150, at 995.
184. E.g., Note, supra note 149, at 995 n.57.
185. E.g., id. at 995 n.60.
186. E.g., id. at 995 n.59.
187. E.g., id. at 995 n.58.
188. See Comment, Strict Liability and the Tortious Failure to Warn, I 1 N.KY. L.J. 409, 428-32
(1984) (discussing the pitfalls in devising jury instructions in failure to warn cases because of the mix
of strict liability and negligence theory bases).
189. One writer discusses the prima facie case for strict liability for failure to warn under the
anomalous heading of "When the Duty Arises," stating the action is comprised of five elements:
(1) Existent risk of harm, inherent or arising from intended or reasonably anticipated use;
(2) Risk in (1) actually known or reasonably foreseeable at time marketed;
(3) Marketing defect of omission or inadequate warning/instructions/directions for
avoiding hazard;
(4) Marketing defect renders product unreasonably dangerous;
(5) Marketing defect constitutes causative nexus in product user's injury.
See Sales, supra note 177, at 269.
190. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402(A) comment j (1977); see Sales, supra note 177,
at 288-92.
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a duty to warn as a predicate to strict liability.' 9 ' Furthermore, the two
basic tests used to determine when a lack of warning is a product defect
under strict liability theory are inextricably caught up with the same con-
siderations as to when a duty arises under negligence theory.
The two basic "defect" tests are the consumer-contemplation test1 92
and the risk-utility test.19 3 Courts will ordinarily utilize only one of these
two approaches.1 94 The application of each, as used in determining
whether a failure to warn constitutes a product defect, is summarized as
follows:
The duty to warn has generally been perceived to arise when the risk
or [sic] harm presented by a product exceeds the danger normally con-
templated or anticipated by the ordinary consumer. As formulated in
the Restatement, the article sold must be dangerous to an extent be-
yond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases it. Underlying the duty to provide an adequate warn-
ing of the dangers associated with the product use is the rationale that
the ultimate user of the product is entitled to all meaningful informa-
tion of a product's characteristics necessary to make an informed
choice whether the utility and need for the product outweighs the po-
tential risk of harm attendant to its use. All products necessarily pres-
ent some potential risk of harm either in their intended or reasonably
foreseeable use or environment of use. It does not follow, however,
that a product posing some risk of harm should not be marketed.
Rather, the ultimate user is entitled to sufficient knowledge of the sig-
nificant dangers to weigh the risk of harm against the need for the
product. 195
Concern over the limitations of product liability is expressed in com-
ments to the Restatement which state that smoking tobacco, whiskey,
and butter are not "unreasonably dangerous" without a warning since
the danger arises from: (1) over-consumption, (2) use over a long period
of time, or (3) a potential of danger which is generally known and recog-
191. Compare Sales, supra note 177, at 288-92 (discussing foreseeability as predicate to duty to
warn in strict liability) with W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 83, § 99 (negligence required).
192. See Keeton, The Meaning of Defect in Products Liability Law-A Review of Basic Principles,
45 Mo. L. RPv. 579, 588 (1980); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment i
(1977) (explaining the meaning of "unreasonable danger").
193. Keeton, supra note 192, at 592. Other tests are also used. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 83, § 99.
194. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 83, § 99, at 698 & n.22 (citing several articles
on these approaches to defining a defect). Some courts employ both tests concurrently. E.g., Welch
v. Outboard Marine Corp., 481 F.2d 252 (5th Cir. 1973); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 519 S.W.2d
87 (1975), overruled, 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979) & 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984).
195. Sales, supra note 177, at 270-71 (footnotes omitted); see id. at 270 nn.9 & 11 (citing case
1986]
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nized. 196 These caveats summarize nicely the typical objections encoun-
tered upon suggestion of the merits of a smokeless suit. This fear that
liability for smokeless "opens the door too far" warrants comment.
First of all, smoking tobacco, 197 whiskey, 198 butter, 99 and other
products may be distinguished from smokeless. The factual circum-
stances of any given product must be individually tested against the
adopted tort theory.2"° Secondly, it can be argued that smokeless does
not fall within the reasoning of the comment's proffered three-part
test.2 ' Thirdly, it is arguable whether modem science and law would
support the conclusions that even the stated examples (tobacco, whiskey,
and butter) would properly fall within the three limitations.20 2 Finally,
these limitations are somewhat anachronistic in their failure to recognize
the significance of latent harm2°3 and addiction.2°
In addition to the "open door" argument, another common objec-
196. RE TATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402(A) comments i, j (1977); see also Page, Generic
Product Risks: The Case Against Comment k and for Strict Tort Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 853,
862-64.
197. Smoking tobacco can only be distinguished by the fact that the danger is well known, due
largely to the government required warning label. See generally Public Health Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1333 (1982); Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92 § 4, 79 Stat. 282, 283 (1965).
198. Whiskey can be distinguished on three points: (1) the resultant harm from whiskey results
from over-consumption (abuse); (2) while alcohol dependence does occur, a very high percentage of
consumers are capable of use without resulting dependence; and (3) the resulting harm is not as
latent, since the symptoms of alcohol abuse are more apparent and result concurrently with con-
sumption. See infra note 240.
199. Butter is distinguished by a much higher utility and a more tenuous causal link to harm.
Moderate consumption by otherwise healthy consumers may pose no danger.
200. While there is certainly merit to concerns that a particular conclusion (e.g., liability re
smokeless) sets a bad precedent, a contrary conclusion (e.g., no liability re smokeless) should be
supported by a rationale furthering a legal doctrine or principle involved. A jurisprudence based on
conclusory linkage of one set of facts with another, without the benefit of an analysis of the linkage is
likely to create more inconsistency and unreliability rather than less. In short, merely pointing to
other products as a defensive argument is intellectual laziness.
201. The first two tests, overconsumption and use over time, are avoidable to a large extent since
in effect the product itself tends to regulate consumption due to its addictive nature. These tests go
to the concept of product abuse, for which the industry has provided no guidance. Presumably, as
long as the product is consumed as intended, the industry view is that overconsumption is not possi-
ble as a practical matter. A good analogy would be the use of chewing gum-overconsumption is
not a known danger. Finally, as already noted, the industry has denied the potential danger. Oral
cancer in general is rare and the resulting harm is latent. Therefore, it would be erroneous to claim
the danger is known and recognized.
202. See, ag., supra note 133. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.N.J.
1984), Judge Sarokin ruled that the mandatory label on cigarettes does not pre-empt product
liability.
203. While virtually all smokeless users experience numbing and skin abrasion, pain is seldom a
symptom of oral cancer. When pain does occur, it usually is because of secondary infection of the
tumor and because of invasion of adjacent structures. While diagnosis and treatment are easy in the
early stages, many users delay attention for mouth lesions because they are so common. Jean,
Smokeless Tobacco Public Enemy No. 1, Orlando Sentinel, July 7, 1985, at G7, col. 2. The survival
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tion to the smokeless suit is the idea that presumably well-informed con-
sumers assume the risks of smokeless consumption. While the
presumption of a well-informed consumer may be factually incorrect, the
assumed risk argument should be considered, arguendo, since warning
labels and publicity of the facts are inevitable.
Even if consumers are well-informed of the health dangers, the as-
sumed risk defense may be simply inappropriate in the tobacco products
setting. It is absurd to presume that a typical tobacco consumer at one
moment decided to commence use of smokeless on a daily basis for an
indefinite number of years into the future. Initial use is experimental.
Subsequent use is primarily the result of physiological impulse, not con-
scious decision-making. If there is a conscious decision-making process
which can be equated with "assumed-risk", it is more properly character-
ized as some quantum of decisions resulting in a resignation to the habit.
In general, the most serious harm which results from tobacco usage
results from multiple usage. Therefore, the assumed risk defense has va-
lidity only if each subsequent decision to use the product can be equated
with the initial decision to "try" the product. It cannot be said that con-
sumers consensually confront the danger in the same way each time the
product is used. The immediacy of the danger changes over time as does
the severity of the habit. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the
type of usage and risk inherent to tobacco products renders the assumed
risk defense inapplicable.
In addition to section 402A, at least fifteen states have concurrently
adopted section 402B.2 °5 Section 402B provides strict liability recovery
against a seller for public misrepresentation of a material fact concerning
the character or quality of a chattel which was justifiably relied upon by a
consumer.20 6 No showing of fault or negligence is required.20 7 This the-
rates are very low once the disease spreads to the neck nodes (one in seven survive over two years).
See Smith, supra note 54, at 450.
Sean Marsee had no mouth sores or other warnings prior to the sore for which he sought
medical assistance. His doctor diagnosed it on the spot as snuff-induced cancer. Interview with
George Braly, attorney of Braly & Braly of Ada, Okla., in Ada, Okla. (Oct. 10, 1985).
204. See, eg., Garner, supra note 14, at 1431-34 (tobacco addiction).
205. LAW AND ECON. CENTER, U. MIAMI, L&EC PRODUCTS LIABILITY AT A GLANCE-1982
(poster 1982).
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1977) reads as follows:
Misrepresentations by Seller of Chattels to Consumer
One engaged in the business of selling chattels who, by advertising, labels, or other-
wise, makes to the public a misrepresentation of a material fact concerning the character or
1986]
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ory, which arose from an early idea of strict liability for deceit,20 8 is es-
sentially a warranty concept.2" 9 Section 402B may better encompass the
wrong since the tobacco industry has done more than merely fail to
warn. Mere passive silence is distinguishable from what might be de-
scribed as "active nondisclosure." First, the industry has made affirma-
tive representations by actively denying the need for a warning.
Secondly, active nondisclosure follows simply due to the peculiar nature
of smokeless. It is natural for consumers to have a heightened expecta-
tion of warning since smokeless is consumed in an unusual manner and
contains tobacco, which is generally known as a health risk. The lack of
a warning implies a false safety. Still, the few cases interpreting section
402B210 and the required elements of "misrepresentation" 21I and "justifi-
able reliance" 212 are serious obstacles.
Punitive damage awards in strict liability cases are a highly contro-
versial subject,213 especially in "mass product litigation" such as the
Dalkon Shield.214 The general trend appears to favor permitting such
awards.215 Regardless of whether knowledge must be shown to win a
compensatory award in strict liability, it definitely must be shown to win
punitive damages.216 Since smokeless presents numerous egregious fac-
tors making punitives appear appropriate, the plaintiff is faced with the
strategic choice of seeking a bifurcated judgment 217 or one based entirely
quality of a chattel sold by him is subject to liability for physical harm to a consumer of the
chattel caused by justifiable reliance upon the misrepresentation, even though
(a) it is not made fraudulently or negligently, and
(b) the consumer has not bought the chattel from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller.
Id.
207. Id.
208. Id comment c.
209. [1] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH) 4042, at 4050.
210. The Products Liability Reporter annotates only 12 cases. See [1] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH)
4042, at 4050-51. A leading case not therein mentioned is Croker v. Winthrop Laboratory Div. of
Sterling Drug, Inc., 514 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. 1974). See also Griswold v. Lange Co., [1] PROD. LIAB.
REP. (CCH) 7634 (D.C. Col. 1976).
211. E.g., Haynes v. American Motors Corp., 691 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1982) (television ad on
driving features of a Jeep were not misrepresentations).
212. E.g., id. (no reliance on commercial causing Jeep accident); Winkler v. American Safety
Equip. Corp., 43 Colo. App. 241, 604 P.2d 693 (1979), rev'd, 640 P.2d 216 (1982) (no reliance on
motorcycle helmet container statements).
213. E.g., RESEARCH GROUP, INC., supra note 172, at 117-19; J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra
note 172, at § 6.04-.05; see also K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 4(A)(2) (1980 & Supp. 1985)
(providing excellent synopsis of all recent commentary and case law).
214. K. REDDEN, supra note 213, § 4.2(A)(2)(b) (Supp. 1985)
215. Id § 4.2(A)(2) (noting tide turning towards allowance of punitive awards). But cf. Page,
supra note 196, at 891 (tide against punitive awards in generic-risk cases).
216. E.g., RESEARCH GROUP, INC., supra note 172, at 116.
217. "Where the principal claim is based on strict liability in tort and there is an additional claim
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on negligence.218 Since knowledge should not be difficult to prove, negli-
gence may be the preferable cause of action because an award of punitive
damages would be less vulnerable on appeal.
The leading article on punitive damages in product liability suits
was written by Professor David Owen,219 whose approach has gained
acceptance in the courts.220 One such court enumerated nine factors
which should be considered in determining if there has been a flagrant
indifference to the public safety justifying punitive damages and the ex-
tent of judicial control necessary to limit the risks of bankruptcy and
excessive punishment.22 x
3. Absolute Liability
Absolute liability, also known as ultra-strict, genuine, or pure strict
liability, has been a product liability theory in search of the right prod-
uct.222 In a nutshell, existing strict product liability is distinguished from
of wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights, it is a simple matter to allow the plaintiff to make a
supplementary showing of aggravating conduct for the purpose of proving entitlement to punitive
damages." Drake v. Wham-O Mfg. Co., 373 F. Supp. 608, 611 (E.D. Wis. 1974); J. GHIARDI & J.
KIRCHER, supra note 172, §§ 6.04, .19-.27 (additional showing for punitives in strict liability); see
also J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 172, § 12 (bifurcation of damages and issues by separate
trials).
218. See, eg., J. GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, supra note 172, § 6.02.
219. Owen, supra note 173, at 1369.
220. E.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Day, 594 P.2d 38, 48 (Alaska 1979), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
(1981).
221. Id. The factors which should be considered are as follows:
(1) the amount of the plaintiff's litigation expenses;
(2) the seriousness of the hazard to the public;
(3) the profitability of the marketing misconduct (increased by an appropriate multiple);
(4) the attitude and conduct of the enterprise upon discovery of the misconduct;
(5) the degree of the manufacturer's awareness of the hazard and of its excessiveness;
(6) the number and level of employees involved in causing or covering up the marketing
misconduct;
(7) the duration of both the improper marketing behavior and its cover-up;
(8) the financial condition of the enterprise and the probable effect thereon of a particular
judgment; and
(9) the total punishment the enterprise will probably receive from other sources.
Id.
222. See generally McClellan, Strict Liability for Drug Induced Injuries: An Excursion Through
the Maze of Products Liability, Negligence and Absolute Liability, 25 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 19-21 (1978)
(explaining conceptual distinctions among the theories and analysis with respect to social goals);
Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681, 713-14 (1980)
(arguing ultra-strict product liability is an embryonic idea with important potential as to manufac-
turer "cost internalization"); Page, supra note 196, at 853 (argues for equal liability treatment for all
generic-risk products regardless if risk is knowable or avoidable); Schwartz, Foreward: Understand-
ing Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 435, 441-48, 488-93 (1979) (discussing application of genu-
ine strict liability to products designed in such a way that their "norm is danger"); Spradley, supra
note 102, at 379-411.
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absolute liability by the former's requirement of a product "defect." '2 23
No showing of a "defect" per se is required under absolute liability, and
thus, it is said the theory makes the manufacturer an insurer of its prod-
uct.224 Although instances noted below have been criticized as tanta-
mount to strict liability, no product liability case has ever been explicitly
based on the theory. Smokeless and smoking tobacco may be among the
first products used to effectuate absolute product liability as a matter of
law.
Absolute liability has been characterized as an economic theory
which is little more than its mirror image: letting the loss lie where it
falls. 22' The theory is not such a radical idea, as evidenced by the fact
that it has been widely embraced in conduct-based tort law. Harm re-
sulting from ultra-hazardous activities such as blasting, crop dusting, or
chemical transportation and storage are subject to absolute liability. 226
Other good examples include the vicarious liability of employers,227 sup-
plier liability,228 injured trespasser situations, 229 and a variety of statutes
which impose strict civil liability.23 °
Claims of absolute product liability have been fairly limited and gen-
erally only go so far as to assert that a holding comes close to absolute
liability.231 For example, commentators have noted that market-share
theory in strict product liability approaches absolute liability since it re-
lieves a plaintiff of showing breach of duty and causation.232 The most
common claim of absolute liability has resulted from cases holding that
knowledge or foreseeability is not an element in failure to warn strict
223. E.g., McClellan, supra note 222, at 21; Schwartz, supra note 222, at 441.
224. Eg., Schwartz, supra note 222, at 441.
225. Fleming, Is There A Future For Tort?, 44 LA. L. REv. 1193, 1208 (1984) (in a perfect
market, efficiency and transaction costs ignored, victim cost is the same).
226. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520A (1977); W. PROsSER & W. KEETON,
supra note 83, § 78.
227. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 83, § 80.
228. Id. § 104.
229. Id. § 79; see Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L. REV. 359
(1951).
230. The best example being workman's compensation schemes. A less familiar example may be
liability for pollution. E.g., United States v. Reilly Tar & Chem. Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1119 (D.
Minn. 1982) (absolute liability for clean-up under Superfund law).
231. "The fact is that many manufacturing defect cases do approach absolute liability. While
design cases require a balancing of risk and utility, manufacturing defect cases do not." Spradley,
supra note 102, at 388 (emphasis added).
232. See Schwartz & Mahshigian, Failure to Identify the Defendant in Tort Law: Towards a
Legislative Solution, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 941, 960 (1985) (focusing on DES and asbestos as "generic"
products); Note, The Market Share Theory: Sindell's Contribution to Industry-Wide Liability, 19
Hous. L. REv. 107, 135-36 (1981); Note, Market Share Liability for Defective Products: An Ill-
Advised Remedy for the Problem of Identification, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 300, 323-26 (1981).
[Vol. 21:499
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products liability actions.233 In particular, the famous asbestos case of
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp.234 has provoked such wide-
spread commentary on this point that it might be cited as the seminal
case on the outer-limits of strict liability.235 In Beshada, the court held
that the manufacturer's ignorance of the danger was not a defense.
23 6
Other examples are cases where comparative or contributory negligence
is held to be no defense in a strict liability suit.237 Finally, cases involv-
ing an undiscoverable defect, as in blood transfusion-hepatitis cases, in-
voke cries of absolute liability.238 However, none of these so-called
extreme or absolute liability cases permitted recovery absent a finding of
a product "defect" under current strict liability concepts.2 39 Presuming
the defect with smokeless is a failure to warn, once a warning label is
provided, nothing in the aforementioned cases would provide precedence
for recovery.24
Since it appears that a form of absolute liability is required for liabil-
ity despite a warning, the question becomes whether such a theory can be
adduced in a manner consistent with current product liability law and
233. See supra text accompanying notes 142-56. There is a large quantity of commentary avail-
able on this hotly debated issue. An excellent source is Wade, The Effect in Product Liability of
Knowledge Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rv. 734, 735 n.1 (1983) (Wade provides
citations to the pertinent portions of 16 articles on the subject).
234. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982).
235. See, eg., Page, supra note 196, at 877-82; Placitella & Darnell, Beshada v. Johns-Manville
Products Corp: Evolution or Revolution in Strict Products Liability?, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 801
(1983); Schwartz, New Products, Old Products, Evolving Law, Retroactive Law, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv.
796, 824-25 (1983); Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the Road to a
Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rav. 892, 901-05 (1983); Wade, supra note 233, at 738-39; Com-
ment, Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically Undiscoverable Product Defects, 71
GEO. L.J. 1635 (1983) (case comment on Beshada); Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social,
and Political Issues Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REv. 573, 605-07 (1983); Birnbaum
& Wrubel, NJ. High Court Blazes New Path in Holding Manufacturer Liable, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 24,
1983, at 24, col. 1; Platt & Platt, Moving From Strict to "Absolute" Liability, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 17,
1983, at 18, col. 3.
236. See Special Project, supra note 235, at 605-07, 626-27 (discussing "state-of-the-art" de-
fense); see also Spradley, supra note 102, at 367-98, 433-37 (state of the art and failure to warn).
237. See, eg., Owen & Moore, Comparative Negligence in a Maritime Products Liability Case:
Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 43 LA. L. Rv. 1543, 1547-48 (1983); Robertson, Ruminations on Comparative
Fault, Duty-Risk Analysis, Affirmative Defenses, and Defensive Doctrines in Negligence and Strict
Liability Litigation in Louisiana, 44 LA. L. REv. 1341, 1349-56 (1984).
238. See, e.g., Spradley, supra note 102, at 380-81; Comment, supra note 150, at 349-56. Both
articles discuss Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 113 Ill. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E.2d 733
(1969), modified, 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970) (blood impurity undetectable) and Green v.
American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962) (generic risk of cigarettes).
239. See supra text accompanying notes 192-93.
240. History of the 1961 American Law Institute Council meetings on § 402A reveals that the
element of defectiveness was retained in the Restatement despite protest, in order to insulate whiskey
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without fully resorting to reasoning steeped in the endless debate over the
significant social objectives of product liability tort law.24' This Com-
ment proffers a single discernment in arguing that an affirmative answer
is possible.
Current tort theory recognizes two basic categories of products:
"unavoidably unsafe" products and "unreasonably dangerous per se"
products. If smokeless and cigarettes are recognized as special legal
specimens falling between these categories, then absolute liability may be
imposed with virtually no displacement of existing product liability law.
An "unreasonably dangerous per se" product is one for which no
warning or instruction for use will justify its marketing.242  Hence, a
manufacturer would be subject to punitive damages for continuous mar-
keting of such a product. A hypothetical example would be the prepara-
tion of poison to be sold for consumption.243 It may be that tobacco is
"unreasonably dangerous per se", or at least such a characterization is
more palatable to some than the below-described alternative, "unavoid-
ably unsafe." However, a more accurate view recognizes that consumers
actively seek the benefits of tobacco despite knowledge of the health
risk.24  Libertarianism aside, it would be unwise for the common law to
attempt to invoke virtual prohibition.
Comment k to the Restatement defines "unavoidably unsafe prod-
ucts" as those which are "quite incapable of being made safe for their
241. Goals include spreading-the-loss, deterrence, and satisfaction or consumer expectations.
See Page, supra note 196, at 883 n.132 (citing Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and
Administration of Strict Tort Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REV. 803, 809-10 (1976)
(discussing seven policy justifications)). Page concludes that incentives for improved safety and sat-
isfying consumer expectations are goals warranting generic product liability. Contra McClellan,
supra note 222, at 24 (reviewing debate with respect to failure to warn cases, concluding loss-spread-
ing is primary goal). See generally Owen, supra note 222, at 704-14 (reconsidering six general
policies).
242. See, eg., Sales, supra note 177, at 271 (citing Brochu v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 642
F.2d 652, 657 (Ist Cir. 1981); d'Hedouville v. Pioneer Hotel Co., 552 F.2d 886, 892 (9th Cir. 1977);
Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1273-74 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974)).
The court in Needham v. White Laboratories, Inc., 639 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1981) stated:
Once it is determined that the product is unavoidably unsafe and that the danger is warned
against, it must be determined whether the product is so unsafe that marketing it at all is
"unreasonably dangerous per se." In order to decide whether the product is unreasonably
dangerous per se, a court must balance the utility of the product against its dangers.
Id. at 401.
243. This hypothetical is drawn from an analogy provided in White, supra note 121, 616 &
n.122. White notes the production of cigarettes is conduct which amounts to intentional infliction of
death as surely as the skidrow vendor who sold a well-labeled heating fuel to winos, knowing they
would drink it for the alcohol content. Id. (discussing Commonwealth v. Feinberg, 211 Pa. Super.
100, 234 A.2d 913 (1967)).
244. See Schwartz, supra note 222, 491 & n.308.
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intended and ordinary use."'2 45 When "properly prepared and marketed,
and proper warning is given... [the seller] is not held to strict liability
for unfortunate consequences attending their use." '46 The classic exam-
ple is an experimental drug. 47 Cigarettes have been referred to as a "ge-
neric-risk" or "norm is danger" product contemplated by comment k.z"8
However, this is debatable. As repeatedly stated throughout this Com-
ment, even in strict liability, failure to warn is based on a reasonableness
standard.2 49 A caveat to comment k continues in that vein. The com-
ment immunity is only available if the manufacturer has "merely ...
undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable
product, attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk."25
Clearly, tobacco is distinguishable from a vaccine in terms of usefulness,
desirability, and reasonableness and thus deserves less protection. Com-
ment k furthers the aforementioned risk-utility type of analysis.2 51 To-
bacco products are of high risk and low utility and therefore deserve little
protection.
To summarize, it can be argued that a virtual prohibition via char-
acterization as "unreasonably dangerous per se" simply goes too far in
245. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment k (1977) provides:
Unavoidably unsafe products.
There are some products which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite
incapable of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use. These are especially
common in the field of drugs. An outstanding example is the vaccine for the Pasteur treat-
ment of rabies, which not uncommonly leads to very serious and damaging consequences
when it is injected. Since the disease itself invariably leads to a dreadful death, both the
marketing and the use of the vaccine are fully justified, notwithstanding the unavoidable
high degree of risk which they involve. Such a product, properly prepared, and accompa-
nied by proper directions and warning, is not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous.
The same is true of many other drugs, vaccines, and the like, many of which for this very
reason cannot legally be sold except to physicians or under the prescription of a physician.
It is also true in particular of many new or experimental drugs as to which, because of lack
of time and opportunity for sufficient medical experience, there can be no assurance of
safety, or perhaps even of purity of ingredients, but such experience as there is justifies the
marketing and use of the drug notwithstanding a medically recognizable risk. The seller of
such products, again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed,
and proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict
liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has under-
taken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product, attended with a
known but apparently reasonable risk.
Id. (emphasis in original).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. E.g., Schwartz, supra note 222, at 491-92; cf. Comment, supra note 150, at 372-77 (discuss-
ing absurdity of assumed risk defense in cigarette case); supra note 240.
249. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 146, 192-95.
250. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A Comment k (1977) (emphasis added).
251. See supra text accompanying note 195; Page, supra note 196, at 891; Wade, A Conspectus of
Manufacturers'Liability for Products, 10 IND. L. REv. 755, 767-68 (1977); cf. McClellan, supra note
222, at 33-36 (arguing for consumer contemplation/utility test).
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light of current social norms. Civil immunity via characterization as
"unavoidably unsafe" is also inappropriate since tobacco lacks redeeming
utility and its habit-forming nature vitiates assumed-risk. Proper charac-
terization lies somewhere between these basic categories. Therefore,
smokeless and other tobacco products can reasonably be said to deserve
treatment which would result in full compensatory liability. In general,
however, once a warning is provided there should be no punitive liability
exposure for the generic risks of tobacco products. As another commen-
tator has written:
Prohibition of the manufacture of cigarettes, their sale or smoking is
not proposed-it is proposed only that the cigarette manufacturing in-
dustry pay the inevitable, and thus intentional [one intends the conse-
quences which are substantially certain to follow from his actions],
cost of its present system of operations. If it cannot do that and sur-
vive, it has no basis on which to claim a right to stay.252
This approach acknowledges the lack of a "defect" as understood in
current legalese, yet permits recovery, thus it is in effect absolute liability.
However, absolute liability is certainly a more sensible policy than the
great non sequitur which now prevails.
[W]hen a cigarette manufacturer, or any other manufacturer for that
matter, markets an inherently dangerous product and thereafter ex-
pends tremendous sums of money and effort advertising and encourag-
ing consumers to disregard the risk, the manufacturer should be held
liable when its perilous invitation is accepted. To profit from know-
ingly enticing another to injure himself and thereafter to escape the
cost of that injury is untenable.25 3
IV. THE INADEQUACY OF PRIVATE LITIGATION
To a large extent our system relies on civil actions, with the poten-
tial for punitive awards, to protect future consumers and to remedy vic-
tims of avoidable harm. In light of the general perception that our
culture is overly litigious, it is notable that only now is the first smokeless
case in process. Since the deadly dangers of smokeless have been known
for decades, the timeliness of this first suit in itself raises questions as to
the adequacy of our system. Even if mass-exposure toxic-tort suits are
ultimately successful, smokeless demonstrates that the civil response to
even widespread problems can be unacceptably laggard.
Poor relations between the medical and legal profession may be
partly to blame. Many victims simply are not referred to lawyers. In
252. See White, supra note 121, at 618-19.
253. See Comment, supra note 150, at 372 & n.184.
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any event, the failure of the legal and medical professions to unite in
pursuing preemptory action from the courts reflects a real shortcoming
in the system. Clearly, the threat of private suits is not always an ade-
quate deterrent.
The smokeless suit also highlights other pervasive inadequacies of
the traditional rules and methods of "private" or bipolar litigation. Diffi-
culties in proving actual causation and the substantial costs of litigating
mass exposure claims on a case-by-case basis make toxic-tort suits prob-
lematic and costly.254 Thus, such suits are unattractive to the "system's
gatekeepers," the plaintiffs' attorneys.255 Inconsistent jury verdicts are
not uncommon.256 Also, once the tide turns against a defendant, bank-
ruptcy can become an issue257 which may result in lower settlements.25 8
Hence, victim compensation becomes too uncertain and incongruous in
such cases.
Toxic-tort suits, such as smokeless, warrant the adoption of progres-
sive legal theories as to causation, administration, and remedy. The car-
dinal requirement of causation is simply inoperative in toxic-tort suits
and should be abandoned or grossly modified. The type of analysis sug-
gested by a scholar from one of a number of divergent schools of thought
may provide a starting point for such a departure.259 A recent commen-
254. See Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of
the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 851, 887-905 (1984).
255. Id.
256. See, eg., Cahan, Jury Verdicts Differ in Dalkon Shield Cases, 14 STUDENT LAW., Sept.
1985, at 7, 7.
257. See, eg., Special Project, supra note 235, at 806-45 (asbestos).
258. For an account of the ordeal of one Dalkon Shield victim who reluctantly settled prior to
A.H. Robbins' filing for bankruptcy, see Hargitai & Span, My IUD Nightmare, GLAMOUR, Oct.
1985, at 197.
259. See Note, Tort Actions for Cancer: Deterrence, Compensation, and Environmental Carcino-
genesis, 90 YALE L.J. 840, 853-62 (1981).
Cancer victims should not be precluded from recovering for their injuries solely because
carcinogenesis is described by a statistical correlation rather than by a cause-and-effect
mechanism. Rather, the statistical correlation should be incorporated into the causation
requirement so that the tort mechanism can effectively deter carcinogen production and
prevent future cancer incidence. It is a statistical certainty that producers of carcinogens
are increasing the incidence of cancer in the general population. The mere fact that the
etiology of the injuries is complex should not shield those producers from legal
responsibility.
Id. at 854-55; see Rosenberg, supra note 254, at 855-60 (advocating "public" rather than "private"
law approach where liability imposed in proportion to the probability of causation assigned to the
excess disease risk in the exposed population, regardless of absence of proof of individualized causal
connection); see also Harley, Proof of Causation in Environmental Litigation, reprinted in ATLA,
Toxic TORTS 403, 403-10 (1977) (discussion of cases involving attempts to prove or disprove causa-
tion through the use of statistics, expert opinion, and other circumstantial evidence-exemplifies the
problems with the traditional approach). See generally Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of
Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven Jr., 43 U. CH. L. Rav. 69, 69-108 (1975) (Calabresi adopts a
1986]
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tator suggested one sensible approach to the problem as follows:
[Courts, applying traditional causation requirements, reject current
scientific understanding of the etiology of cancer as proof of legal cau-
sation in tort suits for cancer, thereby preventing the tort mechanism
from performing its deterrence function. The current limitations of
the tort system could be overcome, however, by a shift in the burden of
proof on the issue of proximate cause once a plaintiff has demonstrated
a threshold exposure to a substance listed in a legislatively enacted cat-
alog of carcinogens.26°
The costly and inefficient administration of a bipolar lawsuit is similarly
an anachronism in the toxic-tort arena. Progressive administration, such
as society-based actions, more appropriately accommodates the needs of
the multiple toxic-tort victims.2 6 1 Finally, progressive remedial tech-
niques include suggestions of damage scheduling and insurance fund
judgments.262
V. CONCLUSION
Whether focusing on the conduct of those who manufacture and sell
smokeless or on the product itself, the herein described view of the medi-
cal experts should convince plaintiffs' attorneys that smokeless is a
proper target for a product liability suit. While the tobacco industry
certainly represents a formidable opponent, as demonstrated by the
smoking cases, this Comment has explained that in addition to a "defec-
tive design" theory, the plaintiff's attorney has available to him a potent
arsenal of alternative recovery theories within the sphere of defective
marketing alone. Failure to warn, whether based on warranty, negli-
gence, or strict liability, is a theory of recovery backed by solid statutory
and case law authority, even as applied to latent diseases such as cancer.
predominately utilitarian or economic approach, allocating the costs to the "cheapest cost avoider";
under this view proximate cause becomes largely irrelevant); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2
J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973). Epstein's work is generalized as being based on common morality and
liberty. It has prompted a wealth of additional scholarly work on the issue of causation. In particu-
lar, see Borgo, Causal Paradigms in Tort Law, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 419 (1979) (the so-called "radical
function approach"); Posner, Epstein's Tort Theory: A Critique, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 457 (1979)
(claiming inconsistency in Epstein's theories and defending several ecbnomic legal theories).
On the general issue of approaching tort law with a mind set beyond that of traditional common
law thought, see Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcON. 1 (1960); Fletcher, Fairness and
Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1972); Gjerdingen, The Coase Theorem and the
Psychology of Common Law Thought, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 711 (1983); Posner, Utilitarianism, Eco-
nomics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979); Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Move-
ment, 96 HARV. L. REv. 563 (1983).
260. Note, supra note 259, at 862.
261. Rosenberg, supra note 254, at 859-60, 905-16 (discussing "public" tort law and class action
theory in toxic-tort suits).
262. Id. at 916-29.
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Smokeless may epitomize the notion of a product which is "unrea-
sonably dangerous per se." The lack of compelling social utility and the
addictive nature of smokeless may render it a product whose "unreasona-
bly dangerous defective condition" cannot be neutralized by a warning.
Short of such an extreme view, this Comment nevertheless provides a
legal analysis, consistent with currently adopted theory, which would ef-
fectively provide for absolute liability despite the inevitable warning la-
bels. Smokeless would be a good archetype of the product which should
"pay its own way." The uninformed, the ignorant, and those stuck with
a habit for which the consequences are latent should not be left prey to
an industry which carelessly markets a product causing such grave harm.
Even when warning labels are present, cognitive assumption of risk is
largely an illusion where the circumstances involve: (1) the young; (2) the
use of a habit-forming substance which is based at least in part on some
cultural phenomenon; (3) a resultant harm which remains latent over
time; and (4) pervasive advertising which encourages disregard of the
warning.
Finally, it is important to recognize the inherent inadequacies of pri-
vate tort law, especially with regard to toxic torts, which smokeless tends
to highlight. A progressive approach to the issues of causation, adminis-
tration, and remedy is suggested.
Michael F McNamara
Author's note: On February 27, 1986, President Reagan signed into law
the Comprehensive Smokeless Tobacco Health Education Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-252 (1986). See supra note 1.
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APPENDIX
A Bibliography of Scientific Evidence Linking Smokeless to Cancer
The 55 sources listed below (in reverse chronological order) are a
small sample of the scientific evidence available.
1. Sabem, Juhl & Schiodt, Oral Malignant and Premalignant
Changes in "Shammah"-Users from the Gizan Region Saudi Arabia, 42
ACTA. ODONTOL. ScAND. 41 (Nor. 1984).
2. Wenke, Brunnemann, Hoffman & Bhide, A Study of Betel Quid
Carcinogenesis, IV Analysis of the Saliva of Betel Chewers: A Prelimi-
nary Report, 108 J. CANCER RESEARCH CLIN. ONCOL. 110 (W. Ger.
1984).
3. Weisburger & Wynder, The Role of Genotoxic Carcinogens and
of Promoters in Carcinogenesis and in Human Cancer Causation, 55
ACTA. PHARMACOL. ToxiCOL. 53 (Den. 1984).
4. Gross, Oral Tobacco: Another Cause for Dizziness, 77 S. MED. J.
772 (1984).
5. Wenke & Hoffmann, A Study of Beta Quid Carcinogenesis. I On
the In Vitro N-Nitrosation of Arecoline, 4 CARCINOGENESIS 169 (1983).
6. Mommsen & Aagaard, Tobacco as a Risk Factor in Bladder
Cancer, 4 CARCINOGENESIS 335 (1983).
7. Uyas, Deshpande, Sharma & Desai, Multiple Primary Cancers
in Indian Population: Metachronous and Synchrono Lesions, 23 J. SURG.
ONCOL. 239 (1983).
8. Heuch, Kuale, Jacobson & Bjelke, Use of Alcohol, Tobacco and
Coffee, and Risk of Pancreatic Cancer, 28 J. CANCER 637 (Eng. 1983).
9. Mommsen, Aagaard & Sell, An Epidemiological Study of Blad-
der Cancer in a Predominately Rural District, 17 SCAND. J. UROL.
NEPHROL. 307 (Swed. 1983).
10. Fraumen, The Face of Cancer in the United States, 19 Hosp.
PRAC. 81 (1983).
11. Stih, Stih & Parida, Elevated Frequency of Micronucleated
Cells in the Buccal Mucosa of Individuals at High Risk of Oral Cancer:
Betel Quid Chewers, 17 CANCER LETrER 125 (1982).
12. Gupta, Pindburg & Nehta, Comparison of Carcinogenicity of
Betel Quid With or Without Tobacco: An Epidemiological Review, 1
ECOL. Dis. 213 (Eng. 1982).
13. Atkinson, Purohit, Reay-Young & Scott, Cancer Reporting in
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New Guinea: 1958-70 and 1971-78, 62 NAT'L CANCER INST. MONOGR.
65 (1982).
14. Mougne, MacLennan & Atsana, Smoking, Chewing and
Drinking in Ban Pong, Northern Thailand, 16 Soc. Sc. MED. 99 (Eng.
1982).
15. Teddy, Naik, Bagga & Chuttani, Salivary Secretions in Oral
Cancer Patients with Chronic Tobacco-Betel-line 'Quid' Chewing, 36 J.
ORAL MED. 7 (1981).
16. Mehta, Gupta & Pindborg, Chewing and Smoking Habits in
Relation to Precancer and Oral Cancer, 99 J. CANCER RESEARCH CLIN.
ONCOL. 35 (1981).
17. Kandarkar, Hasgekar & Sirsat, Optical and Ultarstructural Pa-
thology of Vitamin A Pretreated Hamster Cheek Pouch-Exposed to Lime
(CA(OH)2) and Tobacco Over Total Life Span, 28 NEOPLASMA 729
(Czech. 1981).
18. Jussawalla, Oesophageal Cancer in India, 99 J. CANCER RE-
SEARCH CLIN. ONCOL. 29 (1981).
19. Schottenfield, Snuff Dippers Cancers, 304 NEw ENG. J. MED.
778 (1981).
20. Winn, Blot, Shy, Pickle, Toledo & Fraumeni, Snuff Dipping
and Oral Cancer Among Women in the Southern United States, 304 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 745 (1981).
21. Russell, Jarvis & Feyerbend, A New Age for Snuff?, 1 LANCET
474 (1980).
22. Kirkland, The Nonsmoking Uses of Tobacco, 303 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 165 (1980).
23. Christen, The Case Against Smokeless Tobacco: Five Facts for
the Health Professional to Consider, 101 J. AM. DENT. A. 464 (1980).
24. Ranadive, Ranadive, Shivapurkar & Gothoskar, Betel Quid
Chewing and Oral Cancer: Experimental Studies on Hamsters, 24 INT'L
J. CANCER 835 (1979).
25. Grinspan & Abulatia, Oral Florid Papillomatosis (Verrucous
Carcinoma), 18 INT'L J. DERMATOL. 608 (1979).
26. Hartselle, Oral Carcinoma Related to the Use of Tobacco, 14
ALA. J. MED. SCH. 188 (1977).
27. Smith, Bhargara, Mani, Malaowalla & Silverman, Oral Cancer
and Precancer Lesions in 57,518 Industrial Workers of Gujarat, India, 12
INDIAN J. CANCER 118 (1975).
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28. Mehta, Gupta, Daftary, Pindborg & Choski, An Epidemiologi-
cal Study of Oral Cancer and Precancerous Conditions Among 101, 761
Villagers in Maharashtra, India, 10 INT'L J. CANCER 134 (1972).
29. Jussawalla & Deshpande, Evaluation of Cancer Risk in To-
bacco Chewers and Smokers. An Epidemiological Assessment, 28 CAN-
CER 244 (1971).
30. Tyldesley, Tobacco Chewing in English Coal Miners. A Prelim-
inary Report, 9 BR. J. ORAL SURG. 21 (1971).
31. Mehta, Pindborg, Gupta & Daftary, Epidemiologic and Histo-
logic Study of Oral Cancer and Leukoplakia Among 50, 915 Villagers in
India, 24 CANCER 832 (1969).
32. Pindborg, Kiaer, Gupta & Shawla, Studies in Oral
Leukoplakia. Prevalance of Leukoplakia Among 10,000 Persons in Luck-
now, India with Special Reference to Tobacco and Betel Nut, 37 BULL.
WLD. HLTH. ORG. 109 (1967).
33. Hirayama, An Epidemiological Study of Oral and Pharyngeal
Cancers in Central Southeast Asia, 34 BULL. WLD. HLTH. ORG. 41
(1966).
34. Lendel, Effect of Snuff Taking, 6 MED. WELT. (Ger. 1965).
35. Brown, Suh, Scarborough, Wilkins & Smith, Snuff Dippers In-
traoral Cancer: Clinical Characteristics and Response to Therapy, 18
CANCER 2 (1965).
36. King, Intraoral Leukoplakia, 17 CANCER 131 (1964).
37. Rosenfeld & Callaway, Snuff Dippers Cancer, 106 AM. J.
SURG. 840 (1963).
38. Chandra, Different Habits and Their Relation with Cheek Can-
cer, 1 BULL. CANCER Hosp. NAT'L CANCER RESEARCH CERT. 33
(1962).
39. Volger, Lloyd & Milmore, A Retrospective Study of Etiological
Factors in Cancer of the Mouth, Pharynx, and Larynx, 15 CANCER 246
(1962).
40. Root, Aust & Sullivan, Snuff and Cancer of the Ear, 262 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 819 (1960).
41. Muir & Kirk, Betel, Tobacco and Cancer of the Mouth, 14 BR.
J. CANCER 57 (1960).
42. Peacock & Brawley, An Evaluation of Snuff and Tobacco in the
Production of Mouth Cancer, 33 PLAST. RECONSTR. SURG. 628 (1959).
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43. Shanta & Krishnamurthi, A Study of Actiological Factors in
Oral Squamous Cell Carcinomas, 13 BR. J. CANCER 381 (1959).
44. Wilkins & Volger, Cancer of the Gingiva, 105 SURG. GYN. OB.
145 (1957).
45. Wynder, Bross & Feldman, A Study of the Etiological Factors
in Cancer of the Mouth, 10 CANCER 1301 (1957).
46. Sanghvi, Rao, V.R. & Khanolkar, Smoking and Chewing To-
bacco in Relation to Cancer of Upper Alimentary Tract, 1 BR. MED. J.
1111 (1955).
47. Moore, Bissinger & Proehi, Intraoral Cancer and the Use of
Chewing Tobacco, 1 J. AM. GER. Soc'Y 497 (1953).
48. Gibbel, Cross & Ariel, Cancer of the Tongue: A Review of 330
Cases, 2 CANcER 411 (1949).
49. Ackerman, Verrucous Carcinoma Oral Cavity, 23 SURG. 670
(1948).
50. Friedell & Rosenthal, The Etiological Role of Chewing Tobacco
in Cancer of the Mouth, 116 J. AM. MED. A. 2130 (1941).
51. Padgett, Oral Epidermoid Carcinoma: General Considerations
in Etiological Factors, 22 INT'L J. ORTHODONT. 283 (1936).
52. Maxwell, Betel Chewing and Cancer, 1 BR. MED. J. 729
(1924).
53. Bloodgood, Cancer of the Tongue: A Preventable Disease, 77 J.
AM. MED. A. 1381 (1921).
54. Abbe, Cancer of the Mouth, 102 N.Y. MED. J. 1 (1915).
55. Darmstader, Snuff and Chaw: The Tobacco Industry Plugs
Nicotine by Osmosis, Bus. & Soc' REv. 23 (1980) (noting that in 1761 a
London physician linked snuff to oral cancer.)
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